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Bank of America, N.A. v. Antelope Homeowners' Association

United States District Court, D. Nevada

June 23, 2017

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Plaintiffs,
v.
ANTELOPE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.

          ORDER

         Presently before the court is plaintiff Bank of America, N.A., successor by merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP's (“BANA”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 30). Defendants Las Vegas Development Group, LLC (“LVDG”) (ECF No. 40) and Antelope Homeowners' Association (the “HOA”) (ECF No. 41) filed responses, to which BANA replied (ECF Nos. 59, 60).

         Also before the court is the HOA's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 31).[1] BANA filed a response (ECF No. 39), to which the HOA replied (ECF No. 42).

         Also before the court is a stipulation to stay the case. (ECF No. 58).

         I. Facts

         This case involves a dispute over real property located at 7828 Garden Rock St., Las Vegas, NV 89149 (the “property”).

         On July 2, 2008, Tony Barrios, Justo Barrios, and Kristina Barrios obtained a loan from Universal American Mortgage Company, LLC in the amount of $214, 621.00, which was secured by a deed of trust recorded on July 14, 2008. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4). The note and deed of trust are insured by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”). (ECF No. 1 at 4).

         On June 25, 2009, defendant Alessi & Koenig, LLC (“A&K”), acting on behalf of the HOA, recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due of $1, 002.74. (ECF No. 1 at 4). On August 31, 2009, A&K recorded a notice of default and election to sell to satisfy the delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due of $1, 921.79. (ECF No. 1 at 4).

         On August 9, 2010, A&K recorded a notice of trustee's sale, stating an amount due of $4, 078.25 and scheduling the trustee's sale for September 8, 2010. (ECF No. 1 at 4).

         On March 2, 2011, Las Vegas Development Group, LLC (“LVDG”) purchased the property at the foreclosure sale for $4, 666.00. (ECF No. 1 at 5). A foreclosure deed in favor of LVDG was recorded on March 11, 2011. (ECF No. 1 at 5).

         After the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust, the deed was assigned to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP (“BAC”) via an assignment of deed of trust recorded June 20, 2011. (ECF No. 1 at 4). BAC merged into BANA effective July 1, 2011. (ECF No. 1 at 4).

         On March 2, 2016, BANA filed the underlying complaint, alleging four claims for relief: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against the HOA and A&K; (3) wrongful foreclosure against the HOA and A&K; and (4) injunctive relief against LVDG. (ECF No. 1).

         Clerk's entry of default as to A&K was entered on October 21, 2016. (ECF No. 33). Subsequently, on January 24, 2017, the court dismissed claims (2) though (4) of BANA's complaint. (ECF No. 57).

         In the instant motions, BANA (ECF No. 30) and the HOA (ECF No. 31) both move for summary judgment in their favor. The court will address each as it sees fit.

         II. Legal Standard

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

         For purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.

         In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

         By contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).

         If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987).

         In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

         At summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id. at 249-50.

         III. Discussion

         A. Quiet Title/Declaratory Relief

         As an initial matter, the court takes judicial notice of the following recorded documents: first deed of trust (ECF No. 30-1); notice of delinquent assessment (ECF No. 30-4); notice of default and election to sell (ECF No. 30-5); notice of trustee's sale (ECF No. 30-6); and trustee's deed upon sale (ECF No. 30-7). See, e.g., United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 998- 99 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a court may take judicial notice of public records if the facts noticed are not subject to reasonable dispute); Intri-Plex Tech., Inv. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007).

         Under Nevada law, “[a]n action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.010. “A plea to quiet title does not require any particular elements, but each party must plead and prove his or her own claim to the property in question and a plaintiff's right to relief therefore depends on superiority of title.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore, for plaintiff to succeed on its quiet title action, it needs to show that its claim to the property is superior to all ...


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