THE BOARD OF REVIEW, NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, TRAINING AND REHABILITATION, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION; AND THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, TRAINING AND REHABILITATION, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, Petitioners,
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE; AND THE HONORABLE SCOTT N. FREEMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents, and MCDONALD'S OF KEYSTONE, Real Party in Interest,
petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging a
district court order refusing to dismiss, for lack of
jurisdiction, a petition for judicial review of an
unemployment benefits decision.
Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation,
Employment Security Division, Division of Senior Legal
Counsel, and Laurie L. Trotter and Joseph L. Ward., Jr.,
Carson City, for Petitioners.
Law Offices of Charles R. Zeh, Esq., and Charles R. Zeh,
Reno, for Real Party in Interest.
THE COURT EN BANC.
original writ petition, we are asked to consider whether the
district court should be prevented from hearing real party in
interest McDonald's of Keystone's petition for
judicial review of an unemployment benefits matter, initially
decided by petitioners the Board of Review and the
Administrator of the Nevada Department of Employment,
Training and Rehabilitation, Employment Security Division
(the ESD). We conclude that pursuant to the plain language of
NRS 612.530(1), the district court lacked jurisdiction to
hear McDonald's petition for judicial review. Thus, we
grant the petition for extraordinary relief.
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Gerry is a former employee of McDonald's. In March 2015,
the Board of Review upheld a decision that awarded Gerry
unemployment compensation benefits. In April 2015,
McDonald's filed a petition for judicial review of the
Board's decision with the district court. However, Gerry
was not personally named as a defendant either in the caption
or in the body of the petition for judicial review, although
her full name and address were included within an attachment
to the petition for judicial review.
filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the caption
failed to identify Gerry as a defendant, rendering the
petition for judicial review defective under NRS 612.530(1).
The ESD argued that because Gerry was a party to the
proceedings before the Board of Review, she should have been
included as a defendant in the petition. McDonald's
subsequently filed an opposition to the ESD's motion to
dismiss, as well as a motion to amend its petition for
judicial review to add Gerry as a defendant.
the district court decided that the naming of all relevant
parties as defendants, pursuant to NRS 612.530(1), was not a
jurisdictional requirement. As a result, the district court
denied the ESD's motion to dismiss and granted
McDonald's motion to amend. The ESD now seeks
extraordinary relief, claiming that the district court lacks
jurisdiction to proceed.
writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an
act that the law requires or to control an arbitrary or
capricious exercise of discretion. NRS 34.160; Infl Game
Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist Court, 124 Nev. 193,
197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008). Further, a writ of prohibition
may be warranted when a district court acts without or in
excess of its jurisdiction. NRS 34.320; Smith v. Eighth
Judicial Dist Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849,
851 (1991). Where there is no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, extraordinary relief
may be available. NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330; Smith, 107
Nev. at 677, 818 P.2d at 851. Whether a writ of mandamus or
prohibition will be considered is within this court's
sole discretion. Smith, 107 Nev. at 677, 818 P.2d at
851. This case presents an issue of subject matter
jurisdiction, necessitating our immediate consideration, and
warrants discussion based on the merits. Therefore, this
petition for extraordinary relief is properly before us.
construction is a matter for de novo review. J.D.
Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Int'l Grp., LLC, 126 Nev.
366, 375, 240 F.3d 1033, 1039 (2010). If a statute is clear
and unambiguous, this court gives effect to the plain and
ordinary meaning of its language without examining the other
rules of construction. Id. at 375, 240 P.3d at
1039-40. The statute at issue, NRS 612.530(1), states:
Within 11 days after the decision of the Board of
Review has become final, any party aggrieved thereby or
the Administrator may secure judicial review thereof by
commencing an action in the district court of the
county where the employment which is the basis of the
claim was performed for the review of the decision, in
which action any other party to the proceedings before