United States District Court, D. Nevada
RICKY L. BRIGANCE, Plaintiffs,
STATE OF NEVADA, et al., Defendants.
before the court is defendant the State of Nevada's
(“defendant”) motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 14).
Plaintiff Ricky L. Brigance (“plaintiff”) filed a
response (ECF No. 15), to which defendant replied (ECF No.
instant action arises from a traffic stop by a Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”) officer
on May 24, 2016. Plaintiff was driving his vehicle on a
public road, and plaintiff was stopped by LVMPD. (ECF Nos. 1
at 3; 3 at 3). Officer R. Courtney allegedly did not identify
the reason for the stop and did not articulate the basis for
any reasonable suspicion. (Id.). Plaintiff presented
his driver's license, but was not asked for proof of
registration or insurance. (Id.). Plaintiff also
admitted to having a firearm in the vehicle and a license for
the firearm. (Id.). Officer Courtney confiscated the
firearm and arrested plaintiff for possession of a loaded
firearm. (Id. at 3-4). Plaintiff asserts that the
firearm was not loaded per NRS 503 and that no round was in
the chamber. (Id.). At the time of booking, officer
Courtney allegedly altered the arrest charge to reckless
driving, yet the firearm remained impounded. (Id. at
5). Plaintiff alleges that he was not cited for any
violation, traffic or otherwise. (Id. at 7). The
municipal court dismissed the charge on June 23, 2016, and
closed the matter. (Id. at 5).
January 30, 2017, plaintiff filed the underlying complaint
against defendants the State of Nevada, LVMPD, and officer
Courtney, asserting five claims for relief: (1) civil rights
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) false arrest; (3)
false imprisonment; (4) negligent hiring, training,
supervision, retention; and (5) intentional infliction of
emotional distress. (ECF Nos. 1, 3).
instant motion, the State of Nevada moves to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 14).
may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a]
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2);
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, it demands “more than labels and
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step
approach district courts are to apply when considering
motions to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all
well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however,
legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. Id. at 678-79. Mere recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678.
the court must consider whether the factual allegations in
the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief.
Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the
plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow the court
to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678.
the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
“alleged-but not shown-that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). When the allegations in a complaint have not
crossed the line from conceivable to plausible,
plaintiff's claim must be dismissed. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570.
Ninth Circuit addressed post-Iqbal pleading
standards in Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th
Cir. 2011). The Starr court stated, in relevant
First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth,
allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply
recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain
sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair
notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken
as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such
that it is not ...