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Kelley v. Gedney

United States District Court, D. Nevada

June 5, 2017

JAMES C. KELLEY, Plaintiff,
v.
DR. KAREN GEDNEY, et. al, Defendants.

          REPORT & RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

          WILLIAM G. COBB UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Miranda M. Du, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and the Local Rules of Practice, LR IB 1-4.

         Before the court is the Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Dr. Karen Gedney and Shannon Moyle. (ECF Nos. 23, 24; Exhibits at 23-1 to 23-23-8, 24-1 to 24-8, and 25-1 to 25-5 (filed under seal).)[1] Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 37), and Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 41).

         After a thorough review, the court recommends that Defendants' motion be granted on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.

         I. BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC), proceeding pro se with this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Pl.'s CompL, ECF No. 4.) The events giving rise to this action took place while Plaintiff was housed at Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC). (Id.) Defendants are Dr. Karen Gedney, Nursing Director Jonathan Perry[2], and NNCC Grievance Coordinator Shannon Moyle. (Id)

         On screening, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on allegations that Dr. Gedney failed to treat his hepatitis-C and refused to refer him for surgery for his hernia, and that Perry and Moyle denied his grievances on these issues. (See Screening Order, ECF No. 3.)

         Defendants move for summary judgment arguing: (1) Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) Shannon Moyle did not personally participate in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation; and (3) there is no evidence Dr. Gedney was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs hernia or hepatitis C.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         While Defendants' titled their motion as one for dismissal or summary judgment, all of their arguments rely on evidence outside of the complaint; therefore, the court will treat it as a motion for summary judgment. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (the court will "consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice"); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001).

         "The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court." Northwest Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric, 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). In considering a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). On the other hand, where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

         A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B).

         If a party relies on an affidavit or declaration to support or oppose a motion, it "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).

         In evaluating whether or not summary judgment is appropriate, three steps are necessary: (1) determining whether a fact is material; (2) determining whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact; and (3) considering the evidence in light of the appropriate standard of proof. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-250. As to materiality, only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment; factual disputes which are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be considered. Id. at 248.

         In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court applies a burden-shifting analysis. "When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, 'it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.'...In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine [dispute] of fact on each issue material to its case." C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986).

         If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine dispute exists as to a material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the opposing party need not establish a genuine dispute of material fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). The nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. Id. Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

         That being said,

[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may: (1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it; or (4) issue any other appropriate order.

Fed. R Civ. P. 56(e).

         At summary judgment, the court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. While the evidence of the nonmovant is "to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor, " if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

         III. DISCUSSION

         A. Exhaustion Standard

         The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). An inmate must exhaust his administrative remedies irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).

         The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is '"an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.'" Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204, 216 (2007)), cert, denied., 135 S.Ct. 403 (Oct. 20, 2014). Unless the failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, the defense must be raised in a motion for summary judgment. See Id. (overruling in part Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003)).

         As such: "If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56. If material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts [in a preliminary proceeding]." Id., 1168, 1170-71 (citations omitted). "Exhaustion should be decided, if feasible, before reaching the merits of a prisoner's claim. If discovery is appropriate, the district court may in its discretion limit discovery to evidence concerning exhaustion, leaving until later-if it becomes necessary-discovery related to the merits of the suit." Id. at 1170 (citation omitted). If there are disputed factual questions, they "should be decided at the very beginning of the litigation." Id. at 1171.

         Once a defendant shows that the plaintiff did not exhaust available administrative remedies, the burden shifts to the plaintiff "to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in this particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him." Id. at 1172 (citations omitted). The ultimate burden of proof, however, remains with the defendant. Id.

         Exhaustion cannot be satisfied by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally infirm grievance; rather, the PLRA requires "proper exhaustion." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). "Proper exhaustion" refers to "using all steps the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issue on the merits)." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, "[s]ection 1997e(a) requires an inmate not only to pursue every available step of the prison grievance process but also to adhere to the 'critical procedural rules' of that process. Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006)). "[I]t is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion." Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. That being said, an inmate exhausts available remedies "under the PLRA despite failing to comply with a procedural rule if prison officials ignore the procedural problem and render a decision on the merits of the grievance at each available step of the administrative process." Reyes, 810 F.3d at 658.

         To reiterate, an inmate need only exhaust "available" administrative remedies. See Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016). "Accordingly, an inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are 'capable of use' to obtain 'some relief for the action complained of" Id. at 1859 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 738).

         If the court concludes that administrative remedies have not been properly exhausted, the unexhausted claim(s) should be dismissed without prejudice. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120. If the court finds that the prisoner has exhausted available administrative remedies or that the administrative remedies were not available to him, the case may proceed on the merits. Albino, 747F.3d at 1171.

         B. NDOC ...


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