United States District Court, D. Nevada
DANNY L. HUGHES, Plaintiff,
WARREN W. GOEDERT, et al, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE
the court is Danny L. Hughes's ("plaintiff')
application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1)
and pro se complaint (ECF No. 1-1). Having
thoroughly reviewed the record, the court recommends that
plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis
be granted and the complaint be dismissed as outlined below.
IN FORMA PAUPERJS APPLICATION
on the financial information provided in his application to
proceed in forma pauperis, the court finds that
plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee in this matter.
(See ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, the court recommends
that plaintiffs application to proceed in forma
pauperis be granted.
to proceed in forma pauperis by pro se
plaintiffs are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Section
1915A provides, in relevant part, that "the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that...
the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A
complaint is frivolous when "it lacks an arguable basis
in either law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). This includes claims based on legal
conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against
defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement
of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as
claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g.,
delusional scenarios). Id. at 327-28; see also
McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted is provided for in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same
standard when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint under
§ 1915. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112
(9th Cir. 2012).
Rule 12(b)(6), the court is to dismiss when the complaint
fails to "state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face." Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). Courts accept as true all well-pled factual
allegations, set aside legal conclusions, and verify that the
factual allegations state a plausible claim for relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Although the complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, it must offer more than "a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action" and
"raise a right to relief above a speculative
level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
complaint is construed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Systems/Loral
Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013). The court must
accept as true all well-pled factual allegations, set aside
legal conclusions, and verify that the factual allegations
state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, but must offer more
than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action" and "raise a right to relief above a
speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Particular care is taken in reviewing the pleadings of a
pro se party, for a more forgiving standard applies
to litigants not represented by counsel. Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Still, a
liberal construction may not be used to supply an essential
element of the claim not initially pled. Pena v.
Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). If dismissal
is appropriate, a pro se plaintiff should be given
leave to amend the complaint and notice of its deficiencies,
unless it is clear that those deficiencies cannot be cured.
Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir.
acting pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241 and Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 568 (1967). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) He names as
defendants Warren W. Goedert ("Goedert"), Delmar L.
Hardy ("Hardy"), and Joan C. Wright
("Wright"). (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the
defendants conspired to create a false court record, and
refused to "support or uphold the Judicial Machinery of
the Court." (Id. at 2.)
Count I, plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired to
create a false court record. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts
that the defendants interfered with a state court order
during an arbitration proceeding which constituted a
"Fraud on The Court By an Officer of The Court."
(Id.) Plaintiff submitted sixteen exhibits claiming
they serve as "conclusive, irrefutable proof that
support his allegation. (Id.)
complaint contains miniscule factual allegations for the
court to analyze. Plaintiff does not explain or analyze his
submitted exhibits to lend support to his claim. Although the
court is to construe his complaint liberally, even pro
se plaintiffs must identify some cognizable basis for
each legal claim. That is, it is not for the court to canvass
the United States Constitution and the entirety of the U.S.
Code in order to piece together plaintiffs complaint.
Although he is not required to submit detailed factual
allegations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
one-sentence statements that use legal buzz words or recite
one element of a various claim are not sufficient to state a
claim at the pleading stage. See Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. Accordingly, Count I should be dismissed without
prejudice, with leave to amend.
Count II, plaintiff alleges that Judge Patrick Flanagan
("Judge Flanagan") did not "support or uphold
the Judicial Machinery of the Court" pursuant to
Pierson. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2.) Plaintiff claims that
Judge Flanagan intentionally and knowingly acted to deprive
the plaintiffs constitutional rights by acting "as a
minister of his own prejudices." (Id.) The
court first notes that Judge Flanagan is not a named
defendant in this case. (See Id. at 1.) In addition,
judges enjoy absolute immunity from liability for their
judicial or adjudicatory acts. See Forrester v.
White,484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988); see also Bradley