United States District Court, D. Nevada
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
FERENBACH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
the Court is Plaintiff Jackson Brown's Amended Complaint.
(ECF No. 3). Brown was previously granted leave to proceed
with this action In Forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 2).
Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2), the Court screens
Brown's Amended Complaint to determine whether it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim for which
relief may be granted. For the reasons stated below,
Brown's Amended Complaint should be dismissed with
p.m. on the night of April 10, 2016, Brown walked southbound
on Paradise Road from Elm Drive. ECF No. 3 at 4, 13, 41.
According to Brown, he looked both ways before proceeding
westbound across Paradise Road. Id. at 41. Brown,
however, never made it across. Id. When Brown
arrived at the median, two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Officers (“Metro”) driving northbound stopped
him. Id. at 4. Brown alleges that the Metro Officers
proceeded to place him under arrest, instructing him to stand
by the front of their police van and place his hands on the
hood. Id. at 41.
Metro was placing Brown under arrest, Brown alleges that he
asked the Officers if he was “committing a
felony.” ECF No. 3 at 41. The Metro Officers, according
to Brown, responded that he was “jaywalking” and
that “you can get hit by a car.” Id. The
Officers then proceeded to issue a traffic ticket to Brown
for jaywalking. Id. at 4. Brown objected and asked
the Officers not to give him a ticket. Id. at 41.
Brown alleges that he stated to the Metro Officers that he
“was clearly standing in a ‘safe area' of the
median and [he] did not feel that [he] was in any danger of
getting injured.” Id. Brown further explained
that he did not know he could not cross there. Id.
When Brown initially refused to sign the traffic ticket, he
alleges that the Metro Officers threatened to arrest him and
take him to jail, not to a judge. Id. at 4. Brown
alleges that this was a clear threat to his liberty and his
life and that this was a threat to kidnap him and hold him
for ransom. Id. So, he signed the ticket, but he
claims under duress. Id. at 41.
asserts that the Metro Officers wasted his valuable time and
used his name for financial and possibly political gain in
violation of Nevada law. Id. at 23. In particular,
Brown asserts that there “was no contract between [him]
and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department which
obligated [him] to obey the statutes.” Id.;
ECF No. 3 at 5 (“Police routinely issue tickets and
arrest the people, knowing the citizens are exempt from
government rules, regulations, codes and statutes because
citizens are not factually employees of the organization to
whom those ‘laws' apply”). Brown alleges that
he told both Officers that a verbal warning was sufficient
and that they should allow him to walk away, but they
“both conspired to deprive him of his rights and
sanction him without cause.” Id.
bottom, Brown claims that Metro Officers illegally and
unlawfully issued him a ticket for jaywalking. Brown brings
the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983against Governor Brian Sandoval, Secretary
of State Barbara Cegavske, Attorney General Adam Laxalt,
District Attorney Steven Wolfson, Sheriff Joseph Lombardo,
Traffic Division Referee David Doto, Captain Christopher
Tomaino, Attorney Ruth Miller, Detective McNabb, and Officer
Mitchell for “depriving [him] of [his] right to redress
of the government, equal protection under the law, as well as
federal laws which include but are not limited to Title 18
Sections: 241, 242, 373, 654, 872, 1344, 1348.” ECF No.
3 at 3.
is seeking, inter alia, (1) “ratification and
enforcement of the contract which was lawfully established so
[he] may collect the debt owed and have the agents of
government which are guilty of crimes against the people,
impeached and sanctioned” (2) “that all guilty
parties be impeached and sanctioned for crimes against the
People and [I] am willing to sign the necessary paperwork to
expedite such arrests as the 14th Amendment states that
government must provide equal protection under the law”
(3) “that City, County and State government Officers
cease and desist all fraudulent actions against me or my
person” and (4) “treble damages as punitive and
again treble damages under the R.I.C.O. Act”
Id. at 5.
Court must review Brown's Amended Complaint to determine
whether the Amended Complaint is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a plausible claim. See 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2); see also Cato v. United States, 70
F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). A complaint is frivolous
within the meaning of §1915(e) if it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact, Cato, 70 F.3d at
1106, or is premised on a nonexistent legal interest or
delusional factual scenario, Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). See also Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (A “finding of
factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged
rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly
differently, an action is frivolous where “the court
determines that the claim is: (1) of little or no weight,
value, or importance; (2) not worthy of serious attention; or
(3) trivial.” See Deutsch v. United States, 67
F.3d 1080, 1082 (3rd Cir. 1995); see also Fratus v.
DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 674 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that
dismissal is appropriate for a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory); Boruski v. Stewart, 381
F.Supp. 529, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (stating that a dismissal
under § 1915[e] is appropriate when, inter
alia, the allegations of the complaint are “beyond
credulity”). Nevertheless, if the Court dismisses a
complaint under §1915(e), the plaintiff should be given
leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its
deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the
complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by
amendment. See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1106.
Court's review of Brown's Amended Complaint is guided
by two legal standards: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and
the Supreme Court's decision in Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a) also provides that a complaint “that
states a claim for relief must contain … a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is
entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme
Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, states
that to satisfy Rule 8's requirements a complaint's
allegations must cross “the line from conceivable to
plausible.” 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009). The Court's
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007) and Iqbal prescribe a two-step
procedure to determine whether a complaint's allegations
cross that line.
the Court must identify “the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 680. Factual
allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth if
they are “merely consistent with liability, ”
id. at 678, or “amount to nothing more than a