United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING
EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL (ECF NOS. 547, 550)
P. GORDON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Seng Chen Yong seeks reconsideration of my order (ECF No.
546) that denied his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 547. He
raises three issues about my holding that the government had
probable cause as to his son, Wai Kin, sufficient to
condition Yong's plea on leniency for Wai Kin. First, he
argues I held that the passage of time does not always
dissipate probable cause, whereas his argument was only that
on the facts of this case I must find that probable cause as
to Wai Kin had dissipated. Second, Yong argues that I ignored
exculpatory evidence as to Wai Kin. Third, Yong contends I
erred in holding that the evidence against Wai Kin was
similar to the evidence against other defendants who pleaded
Yong moves for an extension of time to appeal my order. ECF
No. 550. The government does not oppose that motion. ECF. No.
forth the factual background of this case in my prior order,
so I will not repeat those facts here except where necessary.
None of Yong's arguments convinces me that the order is
substantively erroneous, so I deny his motion for
reconsideration. I grant Yong's motion for an extension
of time to appeal from my prior order.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court may relieve a
party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding based on
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the judgment. Stewart v.
Dupnik, 243 F.3d 549, 549 (9th Cir. 2000). “A motion
for reconsideration should not be granted . . . unless the
district court is presented with newly discovered evidence,
committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change
in the controlling law.” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v.
Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)
(internal citation omitted).
motion for reconsideration must set forth some valid reason
why the court should revisit its prior order and facts or law
of a “strongly convincing nature” in support of
reversing the prior decision. Frasure v. United
States, 256 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1183 (D. Nev. 2003). It is
not appropriate for a party to raise a new argument on a
motion for reconsideration. Orange St. Partners v.
Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). Motions for
reconsideration are not “intended to give an unhappy
litigant one additional chance to sway the judge.”
Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F.Supp. 879, 889 (E.D.Va.
Whether Probable Cause Against Wai Kin Dissipated
contends my decision mischaracterized his argument to be that
the passage of time must always dissipate probable cause,
whereas his argument was that probable cause had dissipated
in this case because subsequent investigation did not produce
much additional evidence against Wai Kin.
prior order disagreed with the proposition both as a general
matter and specifically as applied to Wai Kin. Wai Kin was
charged with aiding and abetting the transmission of wagering
information and the operation of an illegal gambling
business. The government alleged that Villa 8888 had most of
the computer equipment necessary for the bet-taking but that
the individuals in all three villas were part of the
conspiracy. Wai Kin and his father, Yong, were staying
in Villa 8881. The search of Villa 8881 produced a gambling
ledger that agents believe represented bets taken by Yong on
behalf of clients. A similar ledger was found in a purse in
Villa 8882 that belonged to Yong. When the search warrant was
executed, Wai Kin was sitting in Villa 8882 with Paul and
Darren Phua. All were using their laptops, logged into
betting sites. Wai Kin's account had a $1.6 million
evidence satisfied the grand jury that probable cause existed
that Wai Kin was involved in World Cup-related gambling
activity that was taking place in the villas. No exculpatory
evidence was produced that strongly undermines that
conclusion. The fact that additional, or stronger, evidence
was subsequently developed against other defendants does not
logically equate to a lack of probable cause for Wai Kin. A
minor player in a conspiracy is still culpable. No aspect of
this case convinces me that the absence of additional
incriminating evidence equates to probable cause dissipating.
Whether Wai Kin Presented Exculpatory Evidence
argues that to the extent I relied on the lack of exculpatory
evidence for my finding that probable cause against Wai Kin
remained, that finding was erroneous. Yong argues Wai Kin
provided exculpatory evidence by explaining to investigators
that the laptop he was using to surf betting sites at the
time the search warrant was executed belonged to his father.
aware of this evidence when I issued my order, and I did not
find it meaningfully exculpatory. When the FBI executed the
warrant, Wai Kin was using the computer, logged in with the
username “WaiKin.” He was actively logged into a
betting site with a $1.6 million account balance. The grand
jury returned an ...