United States District Court, D. Nevada
C. MAHAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the court is Meadow Foxtail Drive Trust, Saticoy Bay,
LLC, Series 3984 Meadow Foxtail Drive
(“Saticoy”), and Paradise Harbor Place
Trust's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 35).
Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) filed a
response (ECF No. 38), and these defendants filed a reply
(ECF No. 45).
before the court is BANA's motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 36). Defendant Sunrise Ridge Master Homeowners
Association (the “HOA”) filed a response (ECF No.
40), as did the other defendants (ECF No. 41). BANA filed a
reply. (ECF No. 46).
before the court is the HOA's motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 37). BANA filed a response (ECF No. 39),
and the HOA filed a reply (ECF No. 44).
action involves the foreclosure and sale of the real property
at 3984 Meadow Foxtail Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada. (ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff confirms that the HOA recorded a notice of
delinquent assessment lien on August 31, 2010.
(Id.). Next, plaintiff indicates that the HOA
recorded a notice of default and election to sell on November
9, 2010. (Id.). Finally, the HOA recorded a notice
of trustee's sale on June 21, 2011. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that the amount owned on each of these
notices did not specify the superpriority lien amount owed.
contends that it offered to tender the super-priority lien
amount to the HOA, based upon its own calculations, and that
the HOA rejected the $378.00 offered amount. (Id.).
The relevant tender letter indicated that the offer amount
was “non-negotiable” and that “any
endorsement of [the] cashier's check . . . will be
strictly construed as an unconditional acceptance on your
part of the facts stated herein and express agreement that .
. . financial obligations towards the HOA . . . have now been
‘paid in full.'” (ECF No. 1-1 at 5).
complaint alleges four claims: (1) quiet title/declaratory
judgment against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113
against the HOA and Nevada Association Services
(“NAS”); (3) wrongful foreclosure against the HOA
and NAS; and (4) injunctive relief against Saticoy. (ECF No.
plaintiff supports its quiet title/declaratory judgment claim
by arguing that NRS Chapter 116 violates BANA's
procedural due process right, the recorded notices vaguely
described the super-priority amount owed on the HOA lien,
tender for the HOA lien was improperly rejected, and by
challenging the foreclosure sale buyers' bona
fide purchaser statuses. (Id.).
March 17, 2016, Saticoy filed a counterclaim to quiet title
in the property and to request declaratory relief. (ECF No.
8). Both the HOA and the other defendants' respective
motions for summary judgment seek a finding that the sale
extinguished plaintiff's interest in the property. (ECF
Nos. 35, 37).
March 10, 2017, this court dismissed plaintiff's second
and third claims while also barring plaintiff's request
for attorneys' fees as special damages. (ECF No. 51).
Therefore, only the opposing claims for quiet title and
plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief remain in this
case. See (ECF Nos. 1, 51).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims . . . .” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
non-moving party must “set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, the court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden
Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000).
Moreover, “[i]n such a case, the moving party has the
initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue
of fact on each issue material to its case.”
contrast, when the non-moving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the non-moving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the non-moving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
Ninth Circuit has held that information contained in an
inadmissible form may still be considered for summary
judgment if the information itself would be admissible at
trial. Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th
Cir. 2003) (citing Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253
F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001) (“To survive summary
judgment, a party does not necessarily have to produce
evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as long
as the party satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 56.”)).
initial matter, the court dismisses, without prejudice, claim
four because the court follows the well-settled rule in that
a claim for “injunctive relief” standing alone is
not a cause of action. See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart
Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig., 490
F.Supp.2d 1091, 1130 (D. Nev. 2007); Tillman v. Quality
Loan Serv. Corp., No. 2:12-CV-346 JCM RJJ, 2012 WL
1279939, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2012) (finding that
“injunctive relief is a remedy, not an independent
cause of action”); Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv.
Corp., 702 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
(“A request for injunctive relief by itself does not
state a cause of action.”). This court proceeds,
considering the motions for summary judgment as they relate
to quiet title.
Nevada law, “[a]n action may be brought by any person
against another who claims an estate or interest in real
property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the
purpose of determining such adverse claim.” Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 40.010. “A plea to quiet title does not
require any particular elements, but each party must plead
and prove his or her own claim to the property in question
and a plaintiff's right to relief therefore depends on
superiority of title.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank
Nat'l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,
for plaintiff to succeed on its quiet title action, it needs
to show that its claim to the property is superior to all
others. See also Breliant v. Preferred Equities
Corp., 918 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1996) (“In a quiet
title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to
prove good title in himself.”).