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Mehudar v. Nydam

United States District Court, D. Nevada

April 26, 2017

DAVID NYDAM II, a man; DOREEN PINE, a woman; TIFFANY PUGH, a woman; RACHAEL HARRIS, a woman, Defendants.



         I SUMMARY

         Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff did not file a proper response to the Motion; instead, she filed a 237-page memorandum of points and authorities (ECF Nos. 14, 14-1).[1] Defendants have replied (ECF No. 22.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion is granted and Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

         In addition, Plaintiff has filed seventeen notices that do not comply with the Local Rules. (ECF Nos. 4, 6, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 39, 41, 42, 45, 46.) The Court therefore directs the Clerk to strike these notices and any attached exhibits from the record.


         Plaintiff Heather Lee Mehudar alleges that she was wrongfully terminated from her employment at Rock Springs Massage Envy in Las Vegas, Nevada, which is allegedly owned by Defendants David Nydam II and Doreen Pine. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) The Complaint does not identify who the other two named Defendants are.

         Plaintiff claims she was the victim of discrimination and harassment, that she was terminated for her disabilities, denied equal compensation, harassed on the basis of her religion and sex, and retaliated against for reporting workplace harassment and hostilities. (Id.) She also claims she is the victim of slander, libel, conspiracy, defamation of character, and additional financial abuse by Defendants.

         Plaintiff appears to bring suit under the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (id. at 2), the Bill of Rights, and Articles VII and IX[2] of the United States Constitution (id. at 1). She seeks $1, 111, 111.11 in compensatory damages, damages for financial suffering and emotional distress, and “three times the claim in punitive damages.” (Id. at 2.)


         A. Legal Standard

         A court may dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Rule 8 notice pleading standard requires Plaintiff to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

         In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 678. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. Second, a district court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged ― but has not shown ― that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations concerning “all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original)). Mindful of the fact that the Supreme Court has “instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading' of pro se litigants, ” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987), the Court will view Plaintiff's pleadings with the appropriate degree of leniency.

         B. Factual Deficiencies

         As a preliminary matter, the Court finds no facts in the Complaint other than Plaintiff's statement that she was terminated by her former employer, Rock Springs Massage Envy and that Defendants Nydam II and Pine are the owners of the business. (See ECF No. 1 at 1.) All other statements in the Complaint are conclusory legal statements without any facts to support them. As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires a short, plain statement of the claim showing entitlement to ...

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