United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is plaintiff/counterdefendant SFR
Investments Pool 1, LLC's (“SFR”) motion to
remand to state court. (ECF No. 13). Intervenor defendant
Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie
Mae”) and defendant/counterclaimant/crossclaimant
Residential Credit Solutions, Inc. (“RCS” and
collectively, with Fannie May, as “defendants”)
filed a response (ECF No. 17), to which SFR replied (ECF No.
filed its original complaint in state court on November 27,
2013. (ECF No. 1-2). The complaint alleges two claims for
relief against defendants Shane K. Scott, a professional
corporation pension plan (“SKS”), RCS, and James
Harding (“Harding”): (1) declaratory relief/quiet
title; and (2) preliminary and permanent injunction. (ECF No.
21, 2016, RCS filed, in state court, an answer, counterclaim,
and crossclaim against SFR and SKS, alleging four claims for
relief: (1) quiet title/declaratory relief; (2) preliminary
and permanent injunction; (3) unjust enrichment; and (4)
declaratory relief. (ECF No. 1-2 at 35-61).
November 23, 2016, the state court granted Fannie Mae's
motion to intervene. (ECF No. 1-2 at 139-41). On December 15,
2016, Fannie Mae filed, in state court, an answer,
counterclaim, and crossclaim against SFR and SKS alleging
four claims for relief: (1) quiet title/declaratory relief;
(2) preliminary and permanent injunction; (3) unjust
enrichment; and (4) declaratory relief. (ECF No. 1-2 at
on December 22, 2016, Fannie Mae removed the state action to
federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. (ECF
instant motion, SFR moves to remand the action to state
court. (ECF No. 13).
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Owen Equip.
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. §
a defendant has thirty (30) days upon notice of removability
to remove a case to federal court. Durham v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)). Defendants are not
charged with notice of removability “until they've
received a paper that gives them enough information to
remove.” Id. at 1251.
“the ‘thirty day time period [for removal] . . .
starts to run from defendant's receipt of the initial
pleading only when that pleading affirmatively reveals on its
face' the facts necessary for federal court
jurisdiction.” Id. at 1250 (quoting Harris
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 425 F.3d 689, 690-91
(9th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original)). “Otherwise,
the thirty-day clock doesn't begin ticking until a
defendant receives ‘a copy of an amended pleading,
motion, order or other paper' from which it can determine
that the case is removable. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.
plaintiff may challenge removal by timely filing a motion to
remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Remand to state court is
proper if the district court lacks jurisdiction. Id.
“A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a
particular case unless the contrary affirmatively
appears.” Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.
1989). Thus, federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist
at the time an action is commenced. Mallard Auto. Grp.,
Ltd. v. United States, 343 F.Supp.2d 949, 952 (D. Nev.
2004) (citing Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal.
State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th
motion to remand, the removing defendant faces a strong
presumption against removal, and bears the burden of
establishing that removal is proper. Sanchez v.
Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403-04 (9th Cir.
1996); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67
(9th Cir. 1992).