United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. Navarro, Chief Judge.
before the Court is the Government's Motion for an Order
Setting a Definite Date to Commence the Second Trial. (ECF
No. 1837). Defendant Peter T. Santilli, Jr.
(“Santilli”) filed a Motion for Joinder (ECF No.
1840), and Defendant Ryan W. Payne (“Payne”)
filed a Response (ECF No. 1844).
March 2, 2016, a federal grand jury sitting in the District
of Nevada returned a Superseding Indictment charging nineteen
defendants with sixteen counts related to a confrontation
with Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) Officers
in Bunkerville, Nevada, on April 12, 2014. (ECF No. 27).
December 12, 2016, Magistrate Judge Peggy Leen entered an
Order (ECF No. 1098) severing the nineteen defendants in this
case into three tiers and informing the parties that the
commencement of each trial will begin 30 days after the
conclusion of the previous trial. As of the date of this
order, the jury for the Tier 3 defendants continues
deliberations for the first trial. The Government requests
that the Court set a definite trial date on, or after, June
5, 2017. (Gov't Mot., ECF No. 1837). Both Santilli and
Payne agree “that having a definite date set for trial
advances [their] interest” and they do not
“oppose the date proposed by the Government.”
(Payne Resp. 3:6-7, ECF No. 1844); (see also
Santilli Mot. Joinder 2:2-6, ECF No. 1840).
Court finds it is appropriate to set a definite trial date
for the Tier 1 defendants in the second trial in this case.
First, the parties need to prepare subpoenas and schedule
their witnesses. (See Gov't Mot. 3:4-9);
(see also Santilli Mot. Joinder 2:5-6).
Additionally, as the Government explains in its Motion, it
“will need time to comply with its ongoing disclosure
obligations under Rule 16.” (Gov't Mot. 3:10-11).
As such, the Court now sets a definite trial date for the
second trial of June 26, 2017.
Sixth Amendment states in pertinent part, “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend VI.
Additionally, the Speedy Trial Act dictates that trial
“shall commence within seventy days from the filing
date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or
from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial
officer of the court in which such charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. §
3161(c)(1). However, the Speedy Trial Act also provides for
several enumerated circumstances in which time is excluded
from the seventy-day deadline. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h);
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 497 (2006)
(“[T]he [Speedy Trial] Act recognizes that criminal
cases vary widely and that there are valid reasons for
greater delay in particular cases. To provide the necessary
flexibility, the Act includes a long and detailed list of
periods of delay that are excluded in computing the time
within which trial must start.”). For these exclusions,
the court must find that “the ends of justice served by
the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests
of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). In the Ninth Circuit, “in
order to comply with the Speedy Trial Act the district court
must satisfy two requirements whenever it grants an
‘ends of justice' continuance: (1) the continuance
must be specifically limited in time; and (2) it must be
justified on the record with reference to the facts as of the
time the delay is ordered.” United States v.
Lloyd, 125 F.3d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal
for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, the Court previously
excluded 30 days between the first and second trial. (Order
Excluding Time, ECF No. 1712). The Court now finds it
appropriate to exclude approximately 35 additional days. The
excluded time is “specifically limited” because
the Court is setting a specific date for the start of trial,
June 26, 2017. As explained in previous orders (see,
e.g., id. 5:16-6:3), the Court finds that this
additional excluded time is necessary and reasonable due to
the complexity of the case and outstanding motions that must
be addressed prior to the start of the second trial.
Therefore, the Court finds that “the ends of justice
served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best
interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy
trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Government's
Motion for an Order Setting a Definite Date to Commence the
Second Trial (ECF No. 1837) is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART. The Court GRANTS
the request for a definite trial date. Trial in this matter
will begin on Monday, June 26, 2017, at 8:30 a.m. before
Chief Judge Gloria M. Navarro in Courtroom 7C. Calendar Call
will be held on Thursday, May 25, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. before
Chief Judge Gloria M. Navarro in Courtroom 7C.
IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peter T. Santilli, Jr.'s
Motion for Joinder (ECF No. 1840) is
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court finds this
continuation is necessary and excusable under the Speedy
Trial Act, Title 18, United States Code, §
 The number of days is an approximation
because there is no verdict in the first trial yet, so it is
unclear when the original 30-day exclusion ...