Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Mountain Gate Homeowners Association

United States District Court, D. Nevada

April 12, 2017

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Plaintiffs,
v.
MOUNTAIN GATE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.

          ORDER

         Presently before the court is plaintiff Bank of America, N.A., successor by merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP's (“BANA”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 65). Defendant Saticoy Bay LLC Series 6408 Hillside Brook (“Saticoy Bay”) filed a response (ECF No. 72), to which BANA replied 74).

         Also before the court Saticoy Bay's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 66). BANA filed a response (ECF No. 70), to which Saticoy Bay replied (ECF No. 75).

         Also before the court is Mountain Gate Homeowners' Association's (the “HOA”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 67). BANA filed a response (ECF No. 71), to which the HOA replied (ECF No. 76).

         I.Facts

         This case involves a dispute over real property located at 6408 Hillside Brook Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 (the “property”).

         On November 11, 2009, Laura Greco obtained a loan in the amount of $93, 279.00, which was secured by a deed of trust recorded on December 21, 2009. (ECF No. 1). The note and the deed were insured by Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”). (ECF No. 1).

         On October 1, 2010, defendant Hampton & Hampton Collections, LLC (“H&H”), acting on behalf of defendant Mountain Gate Homeowners' Association (the “HOA”), recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due of $998.00. (ECF No. 1 at 4). On February 28, 2011, H&H recorded a notice of default and election to sell to satisfy the delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due of $957.00. (ECF No. 1 at 4).

         The deed of trust was assigned to BANA via an assignment deed dated March 32, 2012. (ECF No. 1).

         On March 27, 2014, H&H provided a ledger identifying the amount due for nine months of assessments on the property to be $765.00 to BANA at BANA's request. (ECF No. 1 at 5). The March 27th letter provided that the amount may not include all fees and costs and that “[y]ou must contact the management company directly for these additional amounts.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 2). On April 10, 2014, BANA tendered payment to H&H in the amount of $765.00, of which H&H confirmed receipt on April 11, 2014. (ECF No. 1 at 5-6).

         On July 9, 2014, H&H recorded a notice of trustee's sale, stating an amount due of $3, 306.50. (ECF No. 1 at 4). On August 20, 2014, defendant Saticoy Bay LLC series 6408 Hillside Brook (“Saticoy”) purchased the property at the foreclosure sale for $21, 100.00. (ECF No. 1 at 6). A trustee's deed upon sale in favor of Saticoy was recorded on December 3, 2014. (ECF No. 1 at 6).

         On March 10, 2016, BANA filed the underlying complaint, alleging four causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against H&H and the HOA; (3) wrongful foreclosure against H&H and the HOA; and (4) injunctive relief against Saticoy. (ECF No. 1).

         On April 1, 2016, Saticoy Bay filed a counterclaim against BANA for quiet tittle and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 6).

         In the instant motions, BANA, Saticoy Bay, and the HOA all move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (ECF Nos. 65, 66, 67).

         II. Legal Standard

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

         For purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.

         In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

         By contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).

         If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987).

         In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

         At summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id. at 249-50.

         III.Discussion[1]

         Under Nevada law, “[a]n action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.010. “A plea to quiet title does not require any particular elements, but each party must plead and prove his or her own claim to the property in question and a plaintiff's right to relief therefore depends on superiority of title.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, for plaintiff to succeed on its quiet title action, it needs to show that its claim to the property is superior to all others. See also Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 918 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1996) (“In a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to prove good title in himself.”).

         A. Deed Recitals[2]

         Section 116.3116(1) of the Nevada Revised Statutes gives an HOA a lien on its homeowners' residences for unpaid assessments and fines; moreover, NRS 116.3116(2) gives priority to that HOA lien over all other liens and encumbrances with limited exceptions-such as “[a] first security interest on the unit recorded before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2)(b).

         The statute then carves out a partial exception to subparagraph (2)(b)'s exception for first security interests. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2). In SFR Investment Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, the Nevada Supreme Court provided the following explanation:

As to first deeds of trust, NRS 116.3116(2) thus splits an HOA lien into two pieces, a superpriority piece and a subpriority piece. The superpriority piece, consisting of the last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and maintenance and nuisance-abatement charges, is “prior to” a first deed of trust. The subpriority piece, consisting ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.