United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.,
successor by merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, f/k/a
Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP's
(“BANA”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF No.
65). Defendant Saticoy Bay LLC Series 6408 Hillside Brook
(“Saticoy Bay”) filed a response (ECF No. 72), to
which BANA replied 74).
before the court Saticoy Bay's motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 66). BANA filed a response (ECF No. 70),
to which Saticoy Bay replied (ECF No. 75).
before the court is Mountain Gate Homeowners'
Association's (the “HOA”) motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 67). BANA filed a response (ECF No. 71),
to which the HOA replied (ECF No. 76).
case involves a dispute over real property located at 6408
Hillside Brook Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 (the
November 11, 2009, Laura Greco obtained a loan in the amount
of $93, 279.00, which was secured by a deed of trust recorded
on December 21, 2009. (ECF No. 1). The note and the deed were
insured by Federal Housing Administration
(“FHA”). (ECF No. 1).
October 1, 2010, defendant Hampton & Hampton Collections,
LLC (“H&H”), acting on behalf of defendant
Mountain Gate Homeowners' Association (the
“HOA”), recorded a notice of delinquent
assessment lien, stating an amount due of $998.00. (ECF No. 1
at 4). On February 28, 2011, H&H recorded a notice of
default and election to sell to satisfy the delinquent
assessment lien, stating an amount due of $957.00. (ECF No. 1
deed of trust was assigned to BANA via an assignment deed
dated March 32, 2012. (ECF No. 1).
March 27, 2014, H&H provided a ledger identifying the
amount due for nine months of assessments on the property to
be $765.00 to BANA at BANA's request. (ECF No. 1 at 5).
The March 27th letter provided that the amount may not
include all fees and costs and that “[y]ou must contact
the management company directly for these additional
amounts.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 2). On April 10, 2014, BANA
tendered payment to H&H in the amount of $765.00, of
which H&H confirmed receipt on April 11, 2014. (ECF No. 1
9, 2014, H&H recorded a notice of trustee's sale,
stating an amount due of $3, 306.50. (ECF No. 1 at 4). On
August 20, 2014, defendant Saticoy Bay LLC series 6408
Hillside Brook (“Saticoy”) purchased the property
at the foreclosure sale for $21, 100.00. (ECF No. 1 at 6). A
trustee's deed upon sale in favor of Saticoy was recorded
on December 3, 2014. (ECF No. 1 at 6).
March 10, 2016, BANA filed the underlying complaint, alleging
four causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment
against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against
H&H and the HOA; (3) wrongful foreclosure against H&H
and the HOA; and (4) injunctive relief against Saticoy. (ECF
April 1, 2016, Saticoy Bay filed a counterclaim against BANA
for quiet tittle and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 6).
instant motions, BANA, Saticoy Bay, and the HOA all move for
summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56. (ECF Nos. 65, 66, 67).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy
its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary
judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must
come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute,
the opposing party need not establish a material issue of
fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that
“the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury
or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of
the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac.
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary
judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are
unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must
go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and
set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that
shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the
nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id.
Nevada law, “[a]n action may be brought by any person
against another who claims an estate or interest in real
property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the
purpose of determining such adverse claim.” Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 40.010. “A plea to quiet title does not
require any particular elements, but each party must plead
and prove his or her own claim to the property in question
and a plaintiff's right to relief therefore depends on
superiority of title.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank
Nat'l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,
for plaintiff to succeed on its quiet title action, it needs
to show that its claim to the property is superior to all
others. See also Breliant v. Preferred Equities
Corp., 918 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1996) (“In a quiet
title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to
prove good title in himself.”).
116.3116(1) of the Nevada Revised Statutes gives an HOA a
lien on its homeowners' residences for unpaid assessments
and fines; moreover, NRS 116.3116(2) gives priority to that
HOA lien over all other liens and encumbrances with limited
exceptions-such as “[a] first security interest on the
unit recorded before the date on which the assessment sought
to be enforced became delinquent.” Nev. Rev. Stat.
statute then carves out a partial exception to subparagraph
(2)(b)'s exception for first security interests.
See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2). In SFR
Investment Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, the Nevada Supreme Court
provided the following explanation:
As to first deeds of trust, NRS 116.3116(2) thus splits an
HOA lien into two pieces, a superpriority piece and a
subpriority piece. The superpriority piece, consisting of the
last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and maintenance and
nuisance-abatement charges, is “prior to” a first
deed of trust. The subpriority piece, consisting ...