Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Barnum v. Equifax Information Services, LLC

United States District Court, D. Nevada

April 6, 2017

SHARON BARNUM; JERRY P. CABEBE, ROBERT SUSTRIK, and all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
v.
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, Defendant.

          Matthew I. Knepper, Esq. Miles N. Clark, Esq. KNEPPER & CLARK LLC David H. Krieger, Esq. HAINES & KRIEGER, LLC Henderson, NV 89123 Attorneys for Plaintiff.

          PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

          RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), Plaintiffs Sharon Barnum, Jerry P. Cabebe, and Robert Sustrik (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) move for leave to file a second amended complaint. Most significantly, since the filing of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, the Ninth Circuit has recently handed down specific guidance regarding the scope of a concrete informational injury, and Plaintiffs seek amendment largely to conform several of their damages-based allegations to reflect this new Ninth Circuit guidance. Plaintiffs also wish to clarify their proposed class definition. Plaintiffs consequently seek to adjust their discussion of the viability of their proposed class claims in light of the two proposed modifications. Plaintiffs' request to amend their Complaint comes more than a month in advance of the leave-to-amend deadline, and approximately four months prior to the close of discovery. Plaintiffs have been diligent in seeking to bring their proposed amended complaint now, and defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC (“Equifax”) will suffer no prejudice as a result of having to address the refashioned allegations in Plaintiffs' proposed new pleading. This is Plaintiffs' first motion for leave to amend their complaint.

         This Motion is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings and other filings in this case, and the proposed second amended complaint attached hereto as Exhibit A.

         INTRODUCTION

         Plaintiffs allege that notifying Equifax in writing of claimed inaccuracies on their Equifax credit reports, Equifax failed to timely notify them and a class of similarly situated disputing consumers of the results of its reinvestigations and/or other dispute determinations following completion and/or termination of a reinvestigation of a consumer dispute, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681i. Plaintiffs and proposed class members (1) submitted written disputes to Equifax, (2) triggering the same statutory reinvestigation duties, but (3) Equifax failed to properly notify each of them results of its reinvestigations, which (4) damaged Plaintiffs and Class members in generally the same manner.

         Plaintiff Jerry Cabebe originally sued Equifax in mid-December 2016, and brought an amended complaint as a matter of right the next day. After Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision in Syed v. M-I, Inc., for which a rehearing occurred on March 20, 2017.[1] Among other things, the Syed panel found that “[b]y providing a private cause of action for violations . . . Congress has recognized the harm such violations cause, thereby articulating a ‘chain[] of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy.'”[2] The Syed panel also concluded that the Plaintiff's allegations were “sufficient to infer that [the Plaintiff] was deprived of the right to information” which Congress, through the FCRA, had guaranteed him.[3] While Plaintiffs do not believe that Syed constitutes “new law” in this Circuit, its decision and subsequent discussion of what constitutes a “concrete informational injury” certainly informs Plaintiffs' allegations regarding how Equifax deprived Plaintiffs and a proposed class of similarly situated individuals of their Congressionally authorized right to information under Section 1681i - i.e., timely notification from Equifax regarding the results of their consumer disputes. Based on the very recent authority in Syed, Plaintiffs believe that a minor modification of their damage allegations is warranted, as the reasoning of Syed can properly apply to their claim under Section 1681i. They have updated their damages allegations to more specifically state the same.

         Plaintiffs also wish to update their proposed class definition, in order to better clarify the categories of potential class Plaintiffs. To be sure, the scope of their proposed class will not change as a result of amendment; instead, their proposed modifications are designed to assist both Plaintiff and Equifax in more precisely ascertaining the proposed class, and also in facilitating class-based discovery in the event their proposed class is ultimately certified.

         Based on this change, Plaintiffs also seek to update their discussion of why class-based relief is warranted. Finally, Plaintiffs wish to make several minor changes to their Compliant to clarify several of their damages allegations.

         All of the leave-to-amend factors the Court must consider under the seminal authority of Foman v. Davis are satisfied.[4] Plaintiffs have not unduly delayed bringing this proposed amendment, as it comes a reasonable time after the Syed decision and more than a month prior to the leave-to-amend deadline; indeed, since approximately four months remain to conduct discovery, a presumption against finding undue delay applies. Equifax will not be prejudiced by this amendment, as written discovery has only recently commenced and in fact no written discovery requests have yet been exchanged by the parties; in fact, Plaintiffs' proposed amendments are designed to bring greater clarity to the certification and class-wide discovery process, which arguably results in a benefit to Equifax. There is no evidence of bad faith on Plaintiffs' part. Because Plaintiffs' proposed modifications to their Complaint are all reasonably related to their original allegations, they are not futile. And, while Plaintiffs did previously amend their complaint just after filing the complaint, that amendment came as a matter of right, and so Plaintiffs have not failed to conform their proposed amendments to a judicial directive or exhume them from the grave of prior dismissal. For all of these reasons, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend.

         BACKGROUND

         1. Plaintiffs review their Equifax credit reports and submit written disputes to Equifax, which seek to correct allegedly inaccurate reported information.

         Ms. Barnum obtained an Equifax credit report dated July 10, 2016. After review, she believed that several tradelines contained inaccurate information. On or about August 2, 2016, Ms. Barnum disputed the allegedly derogatory information on her credit report by notifying Equifax in writing of the claimed inaccuracies, and requesting that this information be corrected. Ms. Barnum mailed her dispute letter to Equifax certified, return receipt.[5]

         Mr. Cabebe obtained an Equifax credit report dated May 5, 2016. After review, he believed that a number of allegedly reported inaccurate, derogatory information. On or about July 14, 2016, Mr. Cabebe disputed the allegedly derogatory information on his credit report by notifying Equifax in writing of the claimed inaccuracies, and requesting that this information be corrected. Mr. Cabebe mailed his dispute letter to Equifax certified, return receipt.[6]

         Mr. Sustrik obtained an Equifax credit report dated July 2, 2016. After review, he believed that a number of allegedly reported inaccurate, derogatory information. On or about August 18, 2016, Mr. Sustrik disputed the allegedly derogatory information on his credit report by notifying Equifax in writing of the claimed inaccuracies, and requesting that this information be corrected. Mr. Sustrik mailed his dispute letter to Equifax certified, return receipt.[7]

         2. Equifax fails to properly respond to each of the Plaintiffs' written consumer disputes, violating the FCRA.

         After receipt of Plaintiffs' respective dispute letters (collectively, “Plaintiffs' Dispute Letters”), Equifax was required to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of each respective dispute to determine whether the disputed information was inaccurate under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i, which in turn required Equifax to provide the disputed information to the relevant furnishers of that information, as applicable, no later than five days after receipt of Plaintiffs' Dispute Letters. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2)(A).[8]

         Equifax was required to conduct this reinvestigation before the end of the 30-day period after receiving each of the Plaintiffs Dispute Letters under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). This period could be extended for not more than 15 days under Section 1681i(a)(1)(B) if Equifax received additional relevant information from any of the Plaintiffs during the 30-day reinvestigation period, but none of the Plaintiffs provided additional relevant information to Equifax during the operative period, and so Equifax's deadlines to reinvestigate and notify any of the Plaintiffs were not extended. After completing its reinvestigation, Equifax was required to notify each of the Plaintiffs of the results of its reinvestigation in writing no later the five day after completion. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)(A).[9]

         However, Equifax never timely responded to any of the Plaintiffs Dispute Letters by notifying each of the Plaintiffs, in writing or otherwise, that it had either completed its reinvestigation of her dispute, or determined that the dispute was frivolous and/or irrelevant and terminated its reinvestigation. Because Equifax failed to timely responded to any of the Plaintiffs' Dispute Letters, none of the Plaintiffs knew whether Equifax timely notified any of the relevant furnishers of disputed information as Section 1681i required, nor whether any of these furnishers conducted a timely and proper investigation of the disputed information. Because Equifax failed to notify Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs could not determine whether Equifax timely corrected their disputed credit information, or instead failed to do so, thus causing continued reporting of inaccurate information in violation of Sections 1681i(a)(5)(A)(i)-(ii). Even if Equifax did in fact conduct a timely reasonable reinvestigation of Plaintiffs' respective disputed information, or concluded that her dispute was frivolous, it failed to timely notify any of the Plaintiffs of the same in writing or otherwise, thus violating either Section 1681i(a)(6)(A) or 1681i(a)(3)(B).[10]

         In sum, Equifax's failure to timely notify any of the Plaintiffs of the results of a reinvestigation, or notify Plaintiffs that their disputes were frivolous, violated Section 1681i. Equifax's failure to timely and properly notify Plaintiffs was at least negligent, and on information and belief, was also willful.[11]

         3. Plaintiffs suffer damages as a result of Equifax's FCRA violations.

         Equifax's negligent violation of Section 1681i has caused each of the Plaintiffs to suffer actual damages, cognizable under Sections 1681o and 1681n. Specifically, the Plaintiffs have each considered incurring additional expense in submitting additional correspondence with Equifax to obtain an investigation of the disputed furnisher trade lines. Such costs are concrete and real, as Plaintiffs' time has a real and true intrinsic value in addition to the real value and costs incurred in sending additional correspondence, such as ink, paper, stamps, envelopes and use of a certified mailing service to ensure receipt in addition to the expense already incurred for their original disputes which were disregarded by Equifax. Equifax's failure to timely notify Plaintiffs has also caused them increased uncertainty, anxiety, and other emotional distress, because none of the Plaintiffs have assurances from Equifax that any properly disputed information was timely corrected. Plaintiffs each began suffering these damages on an ongoing basis from the date Equifax's time to respond to their respective Dispute Letter expired under the FCRA. Plaintiffs have been obligated to retain an attorney to prosecute their disputes, and has incurred attorney's fees and costs as a result, recoverable under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681o, 1681n.[12]

         As a result of Equifax's violations of the FCRA, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover actual damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681o, 1681n.[13]

         4. Plaintiffs file the complaint and first amended complaint, and then conduct a discovery conference.

         Plaintiff Jerry P. Cabebe filed the Complaint on December 11, 2016.[14] Before Defendant responded, Mr. Cabebe filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on December 12, 2016, adding Ms. Barnum and Mr. Sustrik as Plaintiffs, and asserting allegations on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals.[15] Equifax filed its Answer to the FAC on February 6, 2017.[16] The parties thereafter held a discovery scheduling conference after which the Court entered a Scheduling Order in this matter on February 28, 2017, setting a discovery deadline for August 7, 2017, [17] and a deadline for filing a motion for leave to amend on May 9, 2017. In the Scheduling Order, the parties added a section entitled “Potential Effect of Class Certification, ” in which they provided that “In the event and after such time as the class is certified, the parties may request additional time to complete discovery. . . .”[18] No written discovery beyond initial disclosures has currently been exchanged by Plaintiffs and Equifax.

         Shortly before the parties' scheduling conference, the Ninth Circuit handed down its opinion in Syed v. M-I, Inc., for which an opinion following rehearing issued on March 20, 2017.[19]While Syed addressed a different provision of the FCRA - Section 1681b, which deals with the “permissible purposes” to which a third party can obtain a consumer report - Plaintiffs believe the reasoning of Syed is applicable to their particular dispute under Section 1681i. This is because in depriving Plaintiffs and Class members of any notification of that their consumer disputes had been received, considered, and properly responded to, Plaintiffs and putative class members suffered a concrete informational injury and lost a benefit conferred on them by Congress. The Syed case and its reasoning were unavailable to Plaintiffs at the time they amended their Complaint in December 2016. However, the Syed case provides Plaintiffs a means to better illustrate their damage allegations.

         Plaintiffs' proposed amendments consist of (1) further clarifying their proposed class definition, [20] and (2) making minor modifications to their damage allegations, [21] (3) making adjustments to their discussion of the viability of seeking class-wide relief, [22] and (4) making other minor adjustments to several additional paragraphs in the Complaint.[23] Their proposed Second Amended Complaint is attached to this Motion as Exhibit A.

         LEGAL STANDARD

         Rule 15(a) governs amendment of a complaint. Under Rule 15(a)(2), “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”[24] Courts apply this policy with “extreme liberality.”[25] While leave to amend a complaint is not automatic, [26] the Court should deny a motion for leave to amend only where there is a “showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party”-considerations commonly referred to as the Foman factors.[27]Additionally, courts often consider whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.[28]Not all of these factors are equally important, however. The Ninth Circuit has highlighted prejudice as the “touchstone” of the Rule 15(a) analysis, and this factor therefore receives the greatest weight.[29] Trial courts in this district have remarked that, “[a]bsent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.”[30] And as one court in this district put it, “[a]ny of the first four factors can serve as a basis for denying leave to amend, but the analysis focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking to amend the complaint, as well as the prejudice to the other party.”[31] Other District of Nevada courts indicate that the party opposing amendment bears the burden to show why amendment should be denied.[32]

         1. Equifax will not suffer undue prejudice from this amendment, as the amendments are minor and discovery has just begun.

         Equifax will suffer no prejudice as a result of amendment. More than a month remains until the leave-to-amend deadline runs on May 9 2017, and the parties have not exchanged written discovery, for which more than four months remain until closure on August 7, 2017. Thus, there is not even an argument that Equifax will have spent the majority of this case responding to discovery directed to a different set of allegations. Moreover, Plaintiffs' proposed amendments consist largely of refashioning Plaintiffs' damage inquiries - particularly clarifying the informational injury allegations in light of Syed. Plaintiffs also seek to clarify their proposed class claims, which will result in less prejudice to Equifax by giving Equifax a clearer impression of the scope of their class claim, which will likely assist the parties in framing their arguments for and against class certification, and in conducting post-certification discovery, as applicable.

         Indeed, the scheduling order in this case contains a section which presupposes that the parties may seek leave to extend the scheduling order deadlines in the event class certification is sought and granted. Since the parties have already accounted for the possibility that discovery may be extended upon class certification, the possibility of unfair surprise to Equifax is minimized. Thus, the “touchstone” favor in the Court's leave-to-amend analysis weighs in favor of granting amendment.

         2. Plaintiffs' did not unduly delay this motion, which is brought more than a month prior to the leave-to-amend deadline.

         The Court's scheduling order sets the leave-to-amend deadline for May 9, 2017, and Plaintiffs' proposed amendment falls well within this deadline. While the undue-delay analysis does not end with the binary determination that scheduling order deadlines are satisfied, if ample time remains to conduct discovery, “a strong presumption against finding undue delay applies.”[33]The Court also considers “whether the moving party knew or should have known the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading, ”[34] and takes into account whether the delay between acquisition of new information and the filing of a proposed amended complaint was “unreasonable.” Intervals of approximately one month between the acquisition of new information and the filing of a proposed amended complaint have been found reasonable.[35]

         In this case, the Syed decision was handed down on January 20, 2017, well after the Complaint and First Amended Complaint were filed. Moreover, publication of an amended order in Syed only occurred on March 20, 2017 - a little over two weeks ago. While Plaintiffs do not believe that Syed introduced any radical new concepts of liability, its discussion of the viability of a “concrete informational injury” is instructive as to how damage allegations could be pled in other FCRA claims, such as this one. Informed by the Syed decision, which was unavailable to Plaintiffs at the time they filed their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs now seek to amend their damage-based allegations.

         As to Plaintiffs' proposed modified class definition, Plaintiffs also did not unduly delay bringing this amendment. As more than three months remain to conduct discovery, moreover, the “strong presumption” against finding undue delay applies to Plaintiffs' proposed amendments. And in as noted above, the parties have not yet exchanged discovery requests. Moreover, A motion for class certification has not yet been filed; but when it is, the parties should be in the best possible position to argue the merits of whether Plaintiffs' claims should be properly brought on a class-wide basis. Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint helps achieve that goal. In sum, this factor weighs in favor of granting amendment.

         3. Plaintiffs have not brought this proposed amendment in bad faith.

         There is no evidence that Plaintiffs have brought this proposed amendment in bad faith. Their proposed amendments consist of clarifications to their existing claims, which stem from Plaintiffs' original claims. Plaintiffs believe that these amendments will in fact better assist Equifax in preparing its defense in this case, and were brought as soon as was practicable after the Syed decision and subsequent rehearing. This factor weighs in favor of granting amendment.

         4. Because Plaintiffs' prior amendment was an amendment as of right, there has effectively been no failure of previous amendments to cure pleading deficiencies.

         When considering whether a party has previously amended their complaint, other trial courts have drawn a distinction between circumstances where an “amended complaint was the result of amendment as of right, not upon successful motion and not after dismissal of claims with instructions on how to cure their deficiencies.”[36] Where prior amendment was made as a matter of right, it “does not weight against amendment.”[37]

         Here, Plaintiffs' first amendment to their complaint came shortly after they filed their original action, and came as a matter of right. There has been no motion practice on the viability of any of Plaintiffs' allegations previously, and no instructions from the Court on how Plaintiffs' allegations should be refashioned to satisfy federal pleading standards. Indeed, as indicated above, Plaintiffs' impetus for bringing this proposed amended complaint stems in part from the Syed decision, which was unavailable to Plaintiffs at the time they brought their first amended complaint. This factor should not weigh in the Court's analysis.

         5. Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, which seeks only to clarify the class definition and make minor modifications to its damage allegations and class discussion, is not futile.

         District courts in this jurisdiction have noted that denial of a motion for leave to amend on futility grounds is “rare, ” and have concluded that “deferring ruling on the sufficiency of the allegations is preferred in light of the more liberal standards applicable to motions to amend and the fact that the parties' arguments are better developed through a motion to dismiss.”[38]

         Here, Plaintiffs' proposed amendments consist largely of restructurings of some of their damage allegations in light of new Ninth Circuit authority, clarification of their class claims, and illustrative discussion of the same in their class-based explanations. These changes are arguably not even the sorts of substantive modifications which make a futility analysis relevant here. To the degree the Court finds it necessary to weigh futility, this factor also favors amendment.

         CONCLUSION

         For all of the above reasons, the Foman factors and the Ninth Circuit's liberal policy favoring amended complaints weigh heavily in favor of granting Plaintiffs' motion for leave. Plaintiffs should be permitted leave to file their Second Amended Complaint.

         IT IS SO ORDERED:

         [PROPOSED] SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES PURSUANT TO THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, ET SEQ. AND FOR RELIEF UNDER THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2201

         INTRODUCTION

         1. The United States Congress has found the banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting. Inaccurate credit reports directly impair the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods undermine the public confidence, which is essential to the continued functioning of the banking system. Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“FCRA”), to insure fair and accurate reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy. The FCRA seeks to ensure consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's right to privacy because consumer reporting agencies have assumed such a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other information on consumers.

         2. A central duty the FCRA imposes upon consumer reporting agencies is the prompt and thorough reinvestigation of disputes which consumers bring to the agency's attention regarding information on the consumer's credit report which is claimed to be inaccurate. The FCRA imposes explicit deadlines for when a consumer reporting agency must complete its reinvestigation of a consumer dispute and notify a consumer of the results of the same. Without prompt, thorough reinvestigation, and timely notice to consumers of the results, consumers have no assurances that their credit is being reported accurately, and suffer from anxiety, stress, and frustration from a perceived continuing damage to their creditworthiness.

         3. Plaintiffs Sharon Barnum (“Ms. Barnum”) Jerry Cabebe (“Mr. Cabebe”), and Robert Sustrik (“Mr. Sustrik”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals (the “Class”), bring this action to challenge the actions of EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC (“Equifax” or “Defendant”) in connection with Equifax's failure to timely notify them and a class of similarly situated disputing consumers of the results of its reinvestigations and/or other dispute determinations following completion and/or termination of a reinvestigation of a consumer dispute, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.

         4. Defendant's failure to timely notify Plaintiffs and Class members of the result of their credit disputes has resulted in, inter alia, damage to Plaintiffs and Class members' perceived creditworthiness.

         JURISDICTION AND VENUE

         5. This Court has federal question jurisdiction because this case arises out of violation of federal law. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.; 28 U.S.C. §1331; Smith v. Community Lending, Inc., 773 F.Supp.2d 941, 946 (D. Nev. 2011).

         6. This action arises out of Defendant's violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681(x) (“FCRA”).

         7. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Plaintiffs are residents of Clark County, the State of Nevada and because Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the County of Clark, State of Nevada as they conduct business there. Venue is also proper because, the conduct giving rise to this action occurred in Nevada. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Further, Equifax has a registered agent of service in Nevada and is listed with the Nevada Secretary of State as a foreign limited liability company doing business in Nevada.

         PARTIES

         8. Plaintiffs are all natural persons residing in the County of Clark, State of Nevada. In addition, Plaintiffs and all putative Class members are “consumers” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c).

         9. Defendant Equifax regularly assembles and/or evaluates consumer credit information for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and uses interstate commerce to prepare and/or furnish the reports. Equifax is a “consumer reporting agency” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f), doing business with its principal place of business in Georgia.

         10. Unless otherwise indicated, the use of Equifax's name in this Complaint includes all agents, employees, officers, members, directors, heirs, successors, assigns, principals, trustees, sureties, subrogees, representatives, and insurers of Equifax.

         EQUIFAX FAILED TO TIMELY NOTIFY PLAINTIFF SHARON BARNUM AFTER RECIPT OF PLAINTIFF'S DISPUTE LETTER OF EQUIFAX'S REINVESTIGATION RESULTS

         11. In an Equifax credit report dated July 10, 2016 (the “Barnum Equifax Credit Report”), Ms. Barnum believed that Comenity Bank/Brylnhme (“Comenity Brylnhme”), Comenity Bank/Lnbrynat (“Comenity Lnbryant”), JPMorgan Chase Bank (“JP Morgan”), Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”), and Wilshire Credit Corporation (“Wilshire”) (collectively, the “Barnum Furnishers”) allegedly reported inaccurate, derogatory information.

         12. On or about August 2, 2016, Ms. Barnum disputed the allegedly derogatory information on the Barnum Equifax Credit Report by notifying Equifax, in writing, of incorrect and inaccurate credit information contained on her Equifax Credit Report, and requested that this information be corrected (the “Barnum Equifax Dispute Letter.”).

         13. Ms. Barnum mailed the Barnum Equifax Dispute Letter to Equifax certified, return receipt.

         14. After receipt of the Barnum Equifax Dispute Letter, Equifax was required to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of the dispute to determine whether the disputed information was inaccurate. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.

         15. Specifically, Equifax was required where applicable to provide the disputed information to the Barnum Furnishers of that information no later than five days after receipt of the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.