United States District Court, D. Nevada
(PLFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - ECF NO. 67;
PLFS' MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD - ECF NO. 68; DEFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - ECF NO. 75; INTERVENORS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - ECF NO. 77; DEFS' MOTION TO
STRIKE - ECF NO. 102)
MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
bring this action against the Department of the Interior
(“DOI”), Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”), Department of Agriculture
(“DOA”), United States Forest Service
(“USFS” or “Forest Service”), and
associated government officials, seeking review of two
agencies' decisions to amend their resource management
plans to provide greater protection to the greater-sage
grouse (“GSG”) species and their
habitat. In particular, Plaintiffs request that the
Court enjoin the agencies from implementing these resource
management plans in Nevada and that they be remanded to the
agencies for further consideration.
the Court are five motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs' Motion”) (ECF
No. 67); (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement
Administrative Record (“Motion to Supplement”)
(ECF No. 68); (3) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Defendants' Motion”) (ECF No. 75); (4)
Intervenors' Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Intervenors' Motion”) (ECF No. 77); and (5)
Defendants' Motion to Strike (ECF No. 102). Plaintiffs,
Defendants and Intervenors filed responses (ECF Nos. 73, 76,
78, 82, 104) as well as replies (ECF Nos. 83, 84, 94, 105),
and Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply.(ECF No. 99). The Court held
a hearing on the Motions on February 1, 2017. (ECF No. 123.)
Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendants failed to comply
with NEPA and remands for preparation of a supplemental
environmental impact statement but denies Plaintiffs'
request to enjoin implementation of the agencies'
resource management plans pending remand.
State of Nevada, nine Nevada counties,  three mining
companies,  and a privately-owned ranch (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) initiated this action on September
23, 2015 to challenge BLM and USFS's (collectively
“the Agencies”) decisions to amend their
respective Land Use and Resource Management Plans
(“Plan Amendments”). (ECF Nos. 1, 20.)
impetus for the adoption of the Plan Amendments originated
with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”). In March 2010, FWS issued a finding on
petitions to list three entities of the greater sage-grouse
as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”). (75 Fed. Reg. 13910 (Mar. 23, 2010).)
FWS found in part that “listing the greater sage-grouse
(range wide) is warranted, but precluded by higher priority
listing actions.” Id. at 13910. FWS further
examined whether existing regulatory mechanisms available to
federal agencies, such as BLM and USFS, adequately protect
sage-grouse species and their habitat and found them to be
mainly inadequate. Id. at 13979-80, 13982. In
response, the Agencies began the process of planning for
incorporation of sage-grouse protection measures into their
land management plans. (ECF No. 75 at 18.) Ultimately, on
September 16 and 21, 2015, the Agencies issued Records of
Decision (“RODs”) approving their respective
management plan amendments, which govern 67 million acres of
federal lands across ten western states. (NV 91784; FS
Plan Amendments guide future land and resource management
decisions on lands administered by BLM and the Forest
Service. (NV 91787; FS 140074.) The Amendments aim to benefit
the greater-sage grouse by maintaining healthy
sagebrush-steppe landscapes while simultaneously ensuring
that the lands maintain multiple uses. While the Plan
Amendments generally established conservation measures for
future decision making, they also contain some conservation
measures that were self-implementing, mandatory, or took
“immediate” effect upon publication of the Plan
Amendments. (NV 90715: FS 140123.) For instance, the Plan
Amendments recommend but do not mandate the withdrawal of
particular public lands - specifically, Sagebrush Focal Areas
(“SFAs”) - from mineral entry under the General
Mining Law, subject to valid existing rights. (NV 91813; FS
140069.) Consistent with the Plan Amendments, BLM petitioned
the Secretary of Interior (“the Secretary”) to
consider proposing a withdrawal. (WO 65706.) However, the
actual withdrawal did not occur until the Secretary decided
to accept BLM's recommendation and issued a Notice of
Proposed Withdrawal and Temporary Segregation (“Notice of
Proposed Withdrawal”) on September 24, 2015, one day
after Plaintiffs initiated this action. (80 Fed. Reg. 57, 635
(Sept. 24, 2015).) By contrast, the Plan Amendments
immediately excluded nonenergy and salable mineral
development on PHMA in Nevada. (NV 91814.)
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiffs
allege that the Agencies' decisions to adopt the Plan
Amendments are contrary to the National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et
seq., the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(“FLPMA”), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et
seq., the National Forest Management Act
(“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq.,
the Small Business Administration Regulatory Flexibility Act
(“SBREFA”), 5 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.,
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5
U.S.C. § 551 et seq., the General Mining Law, 3
U.S.C. § 21 et seq., and the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. (ECF No. 20.)
request that the Court enjoin the DOI and BLM from
implementing the Nevada portion of the BLM Plan and enjoin
the DOA and USFS from implementing the Nevada portion of the
USFS Plan. (Id. at 3, 87-88.) In effect, Plaintiffs
ask this Court to stop Defendants from taking any action that
would interfere with Plaintiffs' continued access to all
Nevada lands (including federal public lands) that were open
for mineral entry or other public use prior to any
segregation resulting from the withdrawal of federal public
lands that was recommended in the RODs. (Id.)
and Defendants have filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
(ECF Nos. 67. 75.) Intervenors have also moved for summary
judgment, joining certain of Defendants' arguments and
asking the Court to deny Plaintiffs' injunction request
or vacatur pending remand even if the Court were to agree
with Plaintiffs on the merits. (ECF No. 77.)
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE (ECF NO. 102) AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD (ECF NO.
Motion to Strike
threshold matter, Defendants seek to strike Exhibits 1, 2 and
6 of Plaintiffs' sur-reply (ECF No. 99), contending that
the information presented is not part of the administrative
record and is presented for the first time in Plaintiffs'
sur-reply. (ECF No. 102.) Plaintiffs counter that the Court
may consider extra-record information for purposes of
standing and the information presented responds to the issues
raised in Defendants' reply. (ECF No. 104.) Plaintiffs
also argue that the information in these exhibits is not
“new evidence . . . but is merely responsive to, and
‘provides the full context' for the ‘selected
recitation of the facts' found in Defendants'
Reply.” (Id. at 2.) However, it is
Plaintiffs' burden to demonstrate standing. See
FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990).
Plaintiff cannot make a general statement to support standing
and then provide more specific information in the sur-reply
after Defendants had challenged the lack of injury to support
Plaintiffs' standing. This is particularly true where the
information was available to Plaintiffs during the briefing
period on the pending motions.
Court agrees with Defendants that the new information
presented for the first time in Exhibits 1 and 2 should be
stricken. As Defendants point out, except for the information
in Exhibit 1 relating to whether Eureka County has access to
an off-site location to store gravel (in paragraph 3),
Exhibit 1 responds to issues raised in Defendants'
Motion, which Plaintiffs should have addressed in their
opposition. (ECF No. 105 at 2-3.) Exhibit 2 addresses White
Pine County's alleged injury with respect to land
disposal, but Defendants challenged this type of injury in
their initial Motion. (ECF No. 99-2; ECF No. 75 at 26.) The
Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs cannot offer
Exhibit 2 for the first time in their sur-reply brief.
do not dispute that Exhibit 6 is not part of the
administrative record, nor does it relate to the issue of
standing which permits the Court to consider extra-record
materials. (ECF No. 104 at 6-7.) Plaintiffs assert that
Exhibit 6 is piece of a demonstrative evidence and shows that
BLM made substantial changes to the Coates habitat map and
that Plaintiffs discussed an identical map in their reply.
(Id.) The Court agrees with Defendants that Exhibit
6 is not part of the administrative record and does not fall
within any exception for consideration of extra-record
materials. Moreover, it is also new information offered for
the first time in Plaintiffs' sur-reply.
Court declines to strike paragraphs 1 through 3 in Exhibit 1
but will grant Defendant's request to strike the
remainder of Exhibit 1 and to strike Exhibits 2 and 6.
Motion to Supplement Record
Court agrees with Defendants that the documents Plaintiffs
seek to be included with the administrative record are not
appropriate for supplementation. In any event, because the
Court remands the RODs to the Agencies, the Court denies
Plaintiffs' motion as moot.
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
insist that Plaintiffs' claims are not justiciable
because (1) the withdrawal of lands for mineral entry was a
separate process from the Plan Amendments, (2) Plaintiffs
lack standing and (3) Plaintiffs' claims are not ripe.
(ECF No. 75 at 22-34.) Defendants further argue that
Plaintiffs' claims fail on the merits. Plaintiffs
disagree. The Court will address the threshold issues first
before reaching the merits.
initial matter, the standard for summary judgment applies to
the threshold issues raised in Defendants' Motion. That
is, in evaluating a summary judgment motion, the court views
all facts and draws all inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v.
Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th
Cir. 1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that
there are no genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v.
MCA Distrib. Corp. 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982).
Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements,
the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to
“set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The nonmoving
party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but
must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or
admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute
exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d
1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, ” Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d
764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
Justiciability of Claims Stemming from Notice of
Mining Companies and several of the other Plaintiffs allege
injuries that arise from the Notice of Proposed Withdrawal,
which resulted in a temporary segregation of PHMA and SFA
from mineral entry. While the choice of what lands to
withdraw from mineral entry is based on the designation of
particular public lands as PHMA or SFA under the Plan
Amendments, such designation did not automatically result in
withdrawal. As Defendants aptly point out, the RODs only
recommended withdrawal of Focal Areas, and BLM was not
required to petition the Secretary for withdrawal nor was the
Secretary obligated to accept BLM's recommendation. (ECF
No. 75 at 32; GBR 10781; NV 90682.) Therefore, despite the
classification of certain lands as PHMA or SFA in the Plan
Amendments, Plaintiffs cannot seek to enjoin the withdrawal
process by challenging the Plan Amendments. Claims that stem
from the Notice of Proposed Withdrawal (counts III, VII, VIII
and IX) are not properly asserted in this case.
Mining Companies appear to believe that the ultimate basis
for their alleged injuries is their inability to comment on
the Plan Amendments' recommendation for mineral
withdrawal. However, the Mining Companies do, in fact, have
the ability to challenge the decision by the Secretary to
accept the recommendation of withdrawal, which the Secretary
could have chosen not to do. Their remedy is to directly
challenge the Secretary's decision to accept BLM's
recommendation to withdraw these lands from mineral entry.
Because the Mining Companies' claimed injuries relate to
the Notice of Withdrawal, they cannot demonstrate Article III
standing to challenge the Plan Amendments. See
discussion infra at sect. IV(B)(1).
analysis of standing involves both Article III limitations as
well as non-constitutional statutory limitations. See
Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. United Pac. Ins.
Co., 219 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2000). In
Defendants' Motion, they argue that Plaintiffs'
claims are not currently justiciable in part because
Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Plan Amendments.
(ECF No. 75 at 22-34.) Specifically, they argue that
Plaintiffs have failed to show they have satisfied the
constitutional requirement that they suffered a concrete and
particularized injury or that such injury is imminent. The
Court finds that only three Plaintiffs have alleged
sufficiently specific facts to demonstrate that they have
suffered a concrete and imminent injury sufficient for
Article III standing.
the number of Plaintiffs and the variety of statutes at issue
in this case, the Court will address both constitutional and
statutory standing with respect to each Plaintiff.
Article III Standing
III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to
‘Cases' and ‘Controversies.'”
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007).
“To satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a
plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in
fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992)). The party invoking federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of establishing these elements.
FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 231.
the party invoking standing also must show that it has
standing for each type of relief sought. Summers v. Earth
Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). However, as
Plaintiffs correctly pointed out at the hearing, only one
Plaintiff needs to show standing for the Court to address the
claims asserted in this case. See Massachusetts, 549
U.S. at 518 (in addressing a challenge to standing, the Court
noted that “[o]nly one of the petitioners needs to have
standing to permit [the Court] to consider the petition for
State of Nevada
state does not have standing as parens patriae to
bring an action against the federal government on behalf of
its citizens, a state may bring suit based on a variety of
proprietary interests - for example, a state may own land or
participate in a business venture. Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, Inc., v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
601, 610 n.16 (1982) (citing Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923)). As a result of
such proprietorship, a state may have standing to bring suit
to remedy harm to those interests. Moreover, a state may
challenge land management practices on federal land that
could affect adjacent state-owned land. See Douglas
County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1995)
(county alleged via affidavit that land management practices
on federal lands would “[fail] to properly manage for
insect and disease control and fire, ” threatening the
productivity and environment of adjoining county lands).
FAC, the State generally alleges that, based on Nevada law,
it has significant interests in the “protection,
propagation, restoration, transplanting, introduction and
management of wildlife in [the] State.” (ECF No. 20 at
4-5 (citing NRS § 501.181(1)(a)).) Specifically, the
State challenges the Plan Amendments' disturbance cap
protocol, claiming that the protocol actually encourages
sage-grouse habitat fragmentation by providing a
“perverse incentive to locate new disturbances in areas
with little existing disturbance, which in turn increases
direct and indirect effects to [the GSG].”
(Id. at 5 (quoting Governor Brian Sandoval).) In
their reply brief, the State also claims that the Plan
Amendments increase the risk for fire and that the Amendments
curb the state Department of Wildlife's ability to
effectively manage wildlife (including the sage-grouse).
(See ECF No. 82 at 17-18.) The crux of the
State's alleged injury is that the Plan Amendments
interfere with land-use planning on state land, a viable
the Court fails to find sufficiently specific facts in
Plaintiffs' various briefs and declarations to
demonstrate how particular binding standards in the Plan
Amendments have caused, or imminently will cause, a concrete
and particularized injury to the State. See Churchill
County v Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1998)
(opinion amended and superseded on denial of rehearing) (city
and county demonstrated a threatened concrete interest by
asserting in affidavits that federal water programs would
harm lands possessed or managed by them by causing fire
hazards, airborne particles, erosion, unknown changes to
underground water supply and reduced quality of local
drinking water). The State identifies the specific Plan
Amendment provisions that allegedly injure them - adaptive
management triggers, allowance of unspecified mitigation
measures, classification of land as “SFA, ” the 3
percent disturbance cap, no mitigation regulation on OHMA,
and travel and transportation management (ECF No. 20 at 67) -
but fails to provide evidence or specific facts showing
exactly how these provisions cause them concrete harm that is
imminent. Instead, they generally allege the provisions will
“have an enormous impact on [sage-grouse] habitat and
interfere substantially with conservation efforts of the
State.” (Id. at 66-67.) This is
insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
the State fails to offer sufficiently specific facts
supported by admissible evidence to satisfy the initial
Article III threshold of injury in fact.
Ninth Circuit has held that “political subdivisions,
such as cities and counties, whose power is derivative and
not sovereign, cannot sue as parens patriae,
although they might sue to vindicate such of their own
proprietary interests as might be congruent with the
interests of their inhabitants.” In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481
F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973). A municipality, such as a
county, has a proprietary interest in its ability to enforce
land-use regulations, its powers of revenue collection and
taxation, and its proprietary interest in protecting natural
resources from harm. See City of Sausalito v.
O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians of Sugar Bowl
Rancheria v. United States, 921 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir.
1990) (land-use); Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Town of
Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1985) (revenue
collection and taxation); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 944 (9th Cir. 2002) (natural
resources). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has determined that
an increased risk of wildfire is sufficient to support
standing. See Delta Water Agency v. United States,
306 F.3d 938, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with the D.C.
Circuit that a substantial risk of wildfire is a threat of
injury that entitles plaintiffs to be heard). Additionally, a
county may assert an injury to its proprietary interests
where “land management practices of federal land could
affect adjacent” county-owned land. Douglas
County, 48 F.3d at 1501.
survive a motion for summary judgment raising standing, the
counties must set forth “specific facts” by
affidavit or by other admissible evidence demonstrating that
they have suffered an “injury in fact” as a
result of the Plan Amendments. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 256; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at
180-81. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
finds that only three counties - Humboldt, Eureka, and Washoe
- have offered sufficiently specific facts supporting the
existence of an injury in fact to withstand Defendants'
FAC, Elko County generally asserts that the travel
restrictions in the Plan Amendments affect 40 percent of all
of the roads in their county as well as segments of roughly
1, 500 miles of county roads. (ECF No. 20 at 44; ECF No.
82-17 at 3.) Specifically, the Plan Amendments prohibit
cross-country travel, use of certain roads during specific
seasons or times of day, and impose limitations on noise
disturbance in designated sage-grouse habitat. (Id.
at 44.) Elko contends that these restrictions interfere with
their land use planning and police powers, such as their
obligation to maintain the transportation system and to
provide emergency services. (Id. at 6.) They also
allege that the grazing restrictions in the Plan Amendments
will cause them environmental harm because of a resulting
“build-up of fuel load on the range and [an] increase
[in] wildfire frequency and intensity.” (Id.)
Elko also states that the Plan Amendments' prohibition on
wind energy development in the PHMA will cause a loss of tax
revenue, pointing to an acknowledgment of such a loss by the
Agencies in the FEIS. (See ECF No. 82 at 6.) The
Court fails to find sufficiently specific facts in the
supporting affidavits and evidence to establish that Elko
County has Article III standing.
declaration of Scott Brown (ECF No. 82-17), the County
provides an example of an alleged injury to county road
maintenance caused by the Plan Amendments. Roughly one-third
of a particular segment of county road that gives residents
access to private land is under the jurisdiction of BLM.
(Id. at 2.) In fiscal year 2015-2016, the County
developed a project to resurface this particular segment of
the road, including the portion under BLM's jurisdiction.
Because of the BLM road segment's proximity to
sage-grouse habitat, BLM required that the Nevada Department
of Wildlife (“NDOW”) approve the County's
application for a Right of Way (“ROW”), which
took approximately a month and a half. (Id. at 3.)
The ROW has yet to be approved, but this can be explained by
the County's failure to provide an updated cultural
resources survey. (See id.; ECF No. 95 at 14.)
assertions about the Plan Amendments' effect on its
ability to maintain roads as evidenced in Mr. Brown's
declaration are not enough to demonstrate Article III
standing. First, the alleged injury occurred after the filing
of this action - the application for the ROW occurred in
November of 2015 (ECF No. 82-17 at 2) - and cannot be relied
upon to show standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569 n.
4 (“The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily
depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is
filed.”) (quoting Newman-Green, Inc. v.
Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989)). Moreover,
the BLM Plan did not change the requirement that the County
obtain approval to resurface BLM's portion of the road.
Rather, the BLM Plan requires that BLM work with local
governments to minimize upgrading existing routes in PHMA and
GHMA unless the upgrade is necessary for public safety.
(See N 90709.) Thus, Elko's claim that its
failure to obtain a ROW has caused Elko monthly maintenance
requirements of approximately $9, 300 is unpersuasive,
especially since Elko offers no reasons why it did not at
least resurface its portion of the road during fiscal year
2015-2016 to avoid these costs.
assertions of other harm are similarly insufficient to
demonstrate standing. Elko relies on a declaration from Demar
Dahl to support its claims regarding the Plan Amendments'
grazing restrictions, travel restrictions, and prohibition on
wind energy projects. (ECF No. 67-2.) First, the grazing
restrictions do not take effect immediately according to the
Plan Amendments; rather, permits are modified over a period
of time and based on site-specific
considerations. Mr. Dahl asserts that the livestock
grazing restrictions will result in increased fire frequency,
but he fails to provide facts to show how these restrictions,
as applied in the future, will result in increased wildfires
in the county. (Id. at 6.) Such alleged potential
harm in the future is not “actual or imminent.”
See Summers, 555 U.S. at 496 (finding a desire to
return without expression of any firm intention to visit a
location subject to the challenged regulation insufficient to
satisfy the imminent injury requirement of standing). Mr.
Dahl also states that the grazing restrictions affect private
ranching and agriculture. (ECF No. 67-2 at 6.) Because Mr.
Dahl does not connect his assertion of injury to private
parties with the proprietary interests of Elko (other than a
general allegation of economic harm) (id. at 7), the
claimed harm to Elko's citizens is asserted as parens
patriae, which Elko cannot bring. See In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481
F.2d at 131.
Mr. Dahl fails to identify any post-decisional injuries
caused by the Plan Amendments' prohibition on wind energy
development; rather, he mentions the County's inability
to proceed on the China Wind Energy Project, which occurred
before the FEIS or Plan Amendments were issued. (ECF No. 67-2
Mr. Dahl raises injuries caused by the travel restrictions:
(1) ranches, hunters, recreationists, and exploration
geologists will be prohibited from road-access to county
lands and cross-country travel; (2) the seasonal and daily
travel restrictions as well as proposed road closures may
impede or even eliminate access to adjacent private land
sections and deprive landowners of access to their private
property; and (3) road closures interfere with the
County's obligation to maintain their roads and provide
for public safety. (Id. at 9-10.) However, the first
two injuries affect private citizens and it is unclear how
they affect the proprietary interests of Elko; and such
injuries are also too speculative and not actual or imminent.
The third injury is too vague (as well as speculative) to
show imminent harm for purposes of rebutting Defendants'
the Court finds that Elko County fails to offer sufficiently
specific facts supported by admissible evidence to satisfy
the initial threshold showing of injury in fact for purposes
of Article III standing.