United States District Court, D. Nevada
LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION METRO INC., et al ., Plaintiffs,
LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant.
D. George United States District Judge
2015, the Nevada Legislature adopted, and the Governor
approved, SB 241. Pursuant to SB 241, Chapter 288 of the
Nevada Revised Statutes was amended to add the following new
A local government employer may agree to provide leave to any
of its employees for time spent by the employee in performing
duties or providing services for an employee organization if
the full cost of such leave is paid or reimbursed by the
employee organization or is offset by the value of
concessions made by the employee organization in the
negotiation of an agreement with the local government
employer pursuant to this chapter.
plaintiffs, the Las Vegas Police Protective Association Metro
Inc. and the Las Vegas Metro Police Managers &
Supervisors Association (the Associations), are employee
organizations representing various employees of the
defendant, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(Metro). They allege that SB 241 is unconstitutional, both on
its face and as applied to the Associations, as viewpoint
discrimination and because it violates their rights and the
rights of their members to associate under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. They
further allege SB 241 violates their rights to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Associations now seek summary judgment on their claims (ECF
No. 24), which Metro opposes (ECF No. 26). Having reviewed
the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, the Court
will deny the motion.
for Summary Judgment
considering a motion for summary judgment, the court performs
“the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is
the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by
a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in
favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); United States v.
Arango, 670 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2012). To succeed on
a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show (1)
the lack of a genuine issue of any material fact, and (2)
that the court may grant judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. Pro. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986); Arango, 670 F.3d at 992.
material fact is one required to prove a basic element of a
claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The failure to
show a fact essential to one element, however,
"necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Additionally, “[t]he
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff's position will be insufficient.”
United States v. $133, 420.00 in U.S. Currency, 672
F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252).
plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322. “Of course, a party seeking summary judgment
always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, ' which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Id., at 323. As such, when the non-moving party
bears the initial burden of proving, at trial, the claim or
defense that the motion for summary judgment places in issue,
the moving party can meet its initial burden on summary
judgment "by 'showing'-that is, pointing out to
the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case." Id.,
at 325. Conversely, when the burden of proof at trial rests
on the party moving for summary judgment, then in moving for
summary judgment the party must establish each element of its
the moving party meets its initial burden on summary
judgment, the non-moving party must submit facts showing a
genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e);
Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies,
Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). As summary
judgment allows a court "to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims or defenses, "
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, the court construes the
evidence before it "in the light most favorable to the
opposing party." Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The allegations or
denials of a pleading, however, will not defeat a
well-founded motion. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986). That is, the opposing party cannot
“‘rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
[its] pleading' but must instead produce evidence that
‘sets forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.'” Estate of Tucker v.
Interscope Records, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)).
initial issue before the Court is whether SB 241 is a content
based restriction on speech, viewpoint or expression.
“[T]he crucial first step in the content-neutrality
analysis [is] determining whether the law is content neutral
on its face. A law that is content based on its face is
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's
benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of
‘animus toward the ideas contained' in the
regulated speech.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
__U.S.__, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (citing
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,
from the Associations' arguments is any citation to any
decision finding that a similar regulation or provision