Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Taylor v. Myles

United States District Court, D. Nevada

March 21, 2017

MICHELLE TAYLOR, Petitioner,
v.
CAROLYN MYLES, Respondent.

          ORDER

          MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         This counseled petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by state prisoner Michelle Taylor is before the Court for final disposition on the merits (ECF No. 1).

         I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY & BACKGROUND

         On November 6, 2009, a jury convicted Taylor of lewdness with a child under 14 years of age and not guilty of indecent or obscene exposure (exhibit 49).[1] On November 13, 2009, Taylor, through the county public defender, filed a motion for judgment of acquittal. (Exh. 54.) The state district court sentenced her to life in prison with parole eligibility after ten years. (Exh. 59.) The judgment of conviction was filed on April 21, 2010. (Exh. 60.)

         Taylor appealed. (Exh. 62.) After Taylor filed the opening brief, her appellate counsel moved to associate out-of-state counsel, Donald Bergerson (Taylor's current federal habeas counsel), to appear as co-counsel. (Exhs. 76-78.) The Nevada Supreme Court granted the motion. (Exh. 80.) On October 27, 2011, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, and remittitur issued on November 21, 2011. (Exhs. 96, 98.)

         Taylor filed a counseled petition. (ECF No. 1.) Respondents have answered the petition (ECF No. 40), and Taylor replied (ECF No. 43).

         II. LEGAL STANDARD UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT (AEDPA)

         28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), provides the legal standards for this Court's consideration of the petition in this case:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

         The AEDPA “modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-694 (2002). This Court's ability to grant a writ is limited to cases where “there is no possibility fair-minded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [Supreme Court] precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011). The Supreme Court has emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (describing the AEDPA standard as “a difficult to meet and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

         A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 74 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). The “unreasonable application” clause requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous; the state court's application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable. Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409).

         In determining whether a state court decision is contrary to federal law, this court looks to the state courts' last reasoned decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, “a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct, ” and the petitioner “shall have the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.