United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER GRANTING IN PART, DENYING IN PART, MOTION TO
RECONSIDER, ECF No. 111
RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
case is before the Court on Defendant Clark County School
District's Motion for Reconsideration, Modification,
and/or Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.
Vanessa Douglas and Sandra Henderson filed their initial
complaint on December 23, 2013. ECF No. 1. Following several
extensions of discovery, Plaintiffs filed their Second
Amended Complaint on August 24, 2015, which is the operative
complaint in this action. ECF No. 90. On September 14, 2015,
Defendants Clark County School District (CCSD) and Bambi M.
Dewey each filed Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 91,
Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs Vanessa Douglas and
Sandra Henderson allege that Defendants Bambi Dewey and John
Stalmach sexually abused Vanessa and that CCSD was
deliberately indifferent to the risk of teacher-student
harassment and abuse in its schools. Vanessa asserts six
causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint: violation
of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), against CCSD;
Negligence against CCSD; Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
claim against CCSD; Assault against Mr. Stalmach and Ms.
Dewey; Battery against Mr. Stalmach and Ms. Dewey; and
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) against
Mr. Stalmach and Ms. Dewey. Plaintiff Sandra Henderson joined
in the seventh cause of action for IIED. However, in
Plaintiffs' response brief to Ms. Dewey's motion for
Summary Judgment, Ms. Henderson agreed to voluntarily dismiss
her IIED claim; the Court allowed the dismissal of this claim
in its order on the Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF No.
110. Therefore, only claims relating to Ms. Douglas are
Court held a hearing on both Motions for Summary Judgment on
March 30 and 31, 2016. ECF Nos. 106, 107. On August 24, 2016,
the Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in
part the Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 110.
Dewey's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied in full.
CCSD's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied as to
Plaintiffs' Title IX and Section 1983 claims. The Court
granted Defendant CCSD discretionary act immunity on
Plaintiffs' negligence claim as to all acts with the
exception of the alleged failure to investigate, which was
permitted to proceed. Defendant CCSD filed the instant Motion
for Reconsideration on September 21, 2016. ECF No. 111. The
Court held a hearing on this motion on November 1, 2016.
long as a district court has jurisdiction over the case, then
it possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider,
rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by
it to be sufficient.” City of Los Angeles, Harbor
Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th
Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). A motion for reconsideration
“may not be used to raise arguments or present
evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have
been raised earlier in the litigation.” Marlyn
Nutraceutricals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co.,
571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). “Motions for reconsideration are
disfavored. A movant must not repeat arguments already
presented unless (and only to the extent) necessary to
explain controlling, intervening law or to argue new
facts.” LR 59-1.
Court relies on the findings of fact articulated in its Order
on the Motions for Summary Judgment.
Reconsideration of the Section 1983 Claims
impose municipal liability under Section 1983 for a violation
of constitutional rights, Plaintiff must show: “(1)
that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of
which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a
policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate
indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and
(4) that the policy is the moving force behind the
constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist.
No. 40 Cty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir.
1997) (internal citations omitted). “[T]here also much
be a ‘direct causal link' between the policy or
custom and the injury, and [plaintiff] must be able to
demonstrate that the injury resulted from a ‘permanent
and well settled practice'… A failure to train or
supervise can amount to a policy or custom sufficient to
impose liability…” Anderson v. Warner,
541 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006).
argue that the Court's finding that CCSD was the
“moving force” behind Stalmach and Vanessa's
sexual misconduct is erroneous and warrants reconsideration.
Defendant argues that the Court improperly evaluated the
“moving force” requirement when Stalmach was
never Vanessa's teacher, and CCSD had no knowledge of the
relationship that developed between Stalmach and Vanessa
outside of school. Defendant argues that the order should be
amended because it fails to recognize that, based on the
undisputed timeline of events, CCSD's response to ...