Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Douglas v. Stalmach

United States District Court, D. Nevada

March 21, 2017

VANESSA DOUGLAS, Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN E. STALMACH, et al., Defendants.

          ORDER GRANTING IN PART, DENYING IN PART, MOTION TO RECONSIDER, ECF No. 111

          RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         I. Introduction

         This case is before the Court on Defendant Clark County School District's Motion for Reconsideration, Modification, and/or Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.

         II. Background

         Plaintiffs Vanessa Douglas and Sandra Henderson filed their initial complaint on December 23, 2013. ECF No. 1. Following several extensions of discovery, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on August 24, 2015, which is the operative complaint in this action. ECF No. 90. On September 14, 2015, Defendants Clark County School District (CCSD) and Bambi M. Dewey each filed Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 91, 94.

         In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs Vanessa Douglas and Sandra Henderson allege that Defendants Bambi Dewey and John Stalmach sexually abused Vanessa and that CCSD was deliberately indifferent to the risk of teacher-student harassment and abuse in its schools. Vanessa asserts six causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint: violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), against CCSD; Negligence against CCSD; Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against CCSD; Assault against Mr. Stalmach and Ms. Dewey; Battery against Mr. Stalmach and Ms. Dewey; and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) against Mr. Stalmach and Ms. Dewey. Plaintiff Sandra Henderson joined in the seventh cause of action for IIED. However, in Plaintiffs' response brief to Ms. Dewey's motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Henderson agreed to voluntarily dismiss her IIED claim; the Court allowed the dismissal of this claim in its order on the Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 110. Therefore, only claims relating to Ms. Douglas are proceeding.

         The Court held a hearing on both Motions for Summary Judgment on March 30 and 31, 2016. ECF Nos. 106, 107. On August 24, 2016, the Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in part the Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 110. Dewey's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied in full. CCSD's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied as to Plaintiffs' Title IX and Section 1983 claims. The Court granted Defendant CCSD discretionary act immunity on Plaintiffs' negligence claim as to all acts with the exception of the alleged failure to investigate, which was permitted to proceed. Defendant CCSD filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration on September 21, 2016. ECF No. 111. The Court held a hearing on this motion on November 1, 2016.

         III. Legal Standard

         “As long as a district court has jurisdiction over the case, then it possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.” City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). A motion for reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Marlyn Nutraceutricals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Motions for reconsideration are disfavored. A movant must not repeat arguments already presented unless (and only to the extent) necessary to explain controlling, intervening law or to argue new facts.” LR 59-1.

         IV. Discussion

         The Court relies on the findings of fact articulated in its Order on the Motions for Summary Judgment.

         A. Reconsideration of the Section 1983 Claims

          To impose municipal liability under Section 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, Plaintiff must show: “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). “[T]here also much be a ‘direct causal link' between the policy or custom and the injury, and [plaintiff] must be able to demonstrate that the injury resulted from a ‘permanent and well settled practice'… A failure to train or supervise can amount to a policy or custom sufficient to impose liability…” Anderson v. Warner, 541 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006).

         Defendants argue that the Court's finding that CCSD was the “moving force” behind Stalmach and Vanessa's sexual misconduct is erroneous and warrants reconsideration. Defendant argues that the Court improperly evaluated the “moving force” requirement when Stalmach was never Vanessa's teacher, and CCSD had no knowledge of the relationship that developed between Stalmach and Vanessa outside of school. Defendant argues that the order should be amended because it fails to recognize that, based on the undisputed timeline of events, CCSD's response to ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.