petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging
the constitutionality and applicability of Nevada's
minimum wage constitutional amendment. Petition denied.
Hejmanowski & McCrea, LLC, and Malani L. Kotchka, Las
Vegas, for Petitioner.
Greenberg Professional Corporation and Leon Greenberg, Las
Vegas, for Real Parties in Interest.
R. Thierman, Joshua D. Buck, Michael Balaban, and Christian
Gabroy, Reno, for Amicus Curiae Nevada National Employment
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP, and Don
Springmeyer and Bradley Schrager, Las Vegas, for Amicus
Curiae Progressive Leadership Alliance of Nevada.
THE COURT EN BANC. 
15, Section 16 of the Nevada Constitution, commonly known as
the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA), guarantees a base wage to
Nevada workers. Under the MWA, if an employer provides health
benefits, it may pay its employees a lower minimum wage than
if no such health benefits are provided. The MWA itself
defines health benefits, and the applicable Nevada
Administrative Code provisions define health insurance.
petition for extraordinary relief, petitioner Western Cab
Company (Western) asks this court to consider whether the MWA
is federally preempted by either the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) and whether the MWA is unconstitutionally vague.
We hold that the MWA is not preempted by the NLRA because the
MWA does not usurp the function of the National Labor
Relations Board (Labor Board), nor does it intrude upon areas
that the United States Congress intended to leave open to the
free market, as minimum wage laws are within a state's
police powers. The MWA is similarly not preempted by ERISA
because it neither references nor connects with ERISA for
Further, the MWA is not unconstitutionally vague because an
employer is sufficiently on notice of what benefits it must
provide to qualify for the lower wage and the MWA does not
promote arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Accordingly,
we conclude that the MWA is valid and deny the instant
petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
and 2006, the people of Nevada passed Question 6 to amend the
Nevada Constitution, adding the MWA. The MWA requires
employers to pay their employees one of two possible wage
rates, depending on whether the employer offers qualifying
health benefits. Nev. Const, art. 15, § 16(A). The MWA
allows for an exception to both of these requirements,
however, if the employer and employees agree to a lower wage
in clear and unambiguous terms through collective bargaining.
Nev. Const, art. 15, § 16(B).
2012, petitioner Western began requiring its drivers to pay
for fuel directly instead of deducting fuel costs from the
drivers' paychecks. Real parties in interest Laksiri
Perera, Irshad Ahmed, and Michael Sargeant, who formerly
drove cabs for Western, filed a complaint against Western
alleging, among other things, that when the fuel costs are
considered, drivers' wages fall below the
constitutionally mandated minimum. Western moved to dismiss
the complaint. It claimed, among other things, that not only
should fuel costs not be considered when calculating the
minimum wage, but the MWA itself is invalid because it (1) is
preempted by the NLRA, (2) is preempted by ERISA, and (3) is
unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied
Western's motion on each of the aforementioned grounds,
and Western now petitions this court for extraordinary writ
issues that we are asked to address are as follows: (1)
whether the NLRA preempts the MWA; (2) whether ERISA preempts
the MWA; (3) whether the MWA is void for vagueness; and (4)
whether, assuming the MWA is valid, fuel costs should be
factored into calculating minimum wage compliance. After
concluding that our immediate review is warranted, we
exercise our discretion to address the validity of the MWA
and conclude that it is valid under all three challenges. We
decline to exercise our discretion regarding the
fuel-calculation issue because that issue depends upon facts
that must be developed in the district court.
the facial challenges to the MWA serves the interests of
judicial economy and streamlines this case, along with other
MWA-related cases currently pending in the district
writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an
act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious
exercise of discretion." Int'l Game
Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev.
193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (footnote omitted);
see NRS 34.160. "A writ of prohibition may be
warranted when a district court acts without or in excess of
its jurisdiction." Manuela H. v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 132 Nev., Adv. Op. 1, 365 P.3d 497, 500
(2016); see NRS 34.320. The decision to entertain an
extraordinary writ petition lies "within this
court's discretion." Libby v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 39, 325 P.3d 1276, 1278
(2014). This court generally refuses to issue an
extraordinary writ when there is a "plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Oxbow Constr., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 86, 335 P.3d 1234, 1238
(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see NRS
34.170; NRS 34.330.
"Generally, we will not exercise our discretion to
consider writ petitions challenging district court orders
denying motions to dismiss, unless pursuant to clear
authority under a statute or rule, the district court is
obligated to dismiss an action... or an important issue of
law requires clarification." Moseley v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 654, 658, 188 P.3d 1136,
1140 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The policy
behind our hesitation to entertain writ petitions that
challenge such orders is to promote judicial economy and
avoid "piecemeal appellate review." Wells Fargo
Bank, NA. v. O'Brien, 129 Nev. 679, 680, 310 P.3d
581, 582 (2013). As a general principle, we practice judicial
restraint, avoiding legal and constitutional issues if
unnecessary to resolve the case at hand. Miller v.
Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 588-89, 188 P.3d 1112, 1118-19
(2008). We may, however, use our discretion to consider writ
petitions "when . . . judicial economy is served by
considering the writ petition." Renown Reg'l
Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist Court, 130 Nev., Adv.
Op. 80, 335 P.3d 199, 202 (2014).
instant petition seeks reversal of a denial of a motion to
dismiss. Although we typically deny such petitions,
considering this petition would serve judicial economy and
clarify an important issue of law. Three of the four
substantive issues in the petition deal with invalidating the
MWA. If the MWA is invalid, then ...