Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Poshbaby LLC v. Lake Las Vegas Southshore Residential Community Association

United States District Court, D. Nevada

March 13, 2017

POSHBABY LLC, Plaintiff(s),


         Presently before the court is the matter of Poshbaby LLC v. Arizona Labor Force, Incorporated et al., case number 2:13-cv-01819-JCM-GWF.

         I. Background

         On December 21, 2016, the court ordered the parties to file a stipulated discovery plan and scheduling order no later than January 12, 2017. (ECF No. 84). Prior to that order, the last entry on the docket was a notice of address change entered July 15, 2016. (ECF No. 83).[1]

         Also prior to these entries, on January 14, 2016, the court entered a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), stating that plaintiff Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) had not filed proper proof of service of the amended complaint as to defendants E&F Cannon, Inc., P-C Plumbing, Inc., and Talon Electric, LLC and setting the 4(m) dismissal deadline for February 13, 2016. (ECF No. 73). To date, no proof of service has been filed as to these defendants. On January 6, 2017, BANA filed a notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice of its claims against Ma'An Nasir and Robert Avery. (ECF No. 85).

         On January 12, 2017, BANA filed a motion to extend the discovery plan deadline asserting that BANA and defendant Poshbaby LLC (Poshbaby”) reached a settlement, which will likely include dismissal of certain claims asserted by BANA. (ECF No. 86 at 2). In granting BANA's motion, the court ordered that the parties file a proposed discovery plan and scheduling order or notice of settlement by February 13, 2017. (ECF No. 90). To date, no proposed discovery plan, scheduling order, or notice of settlement has been filed. Nor have the parties filed any requests for extensions; nor has BANA filed any notice dismissing certain claims asserted thereby (ECF No. 86).

         Rather than complying with the court's order, Poshbaby instead filed a stipulation to substitute the real party in interest and amend the caption on February 13, 2017. (ECF No. 92).

         On February 22, 2017, the court entered an order to show cause as to why the instant case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with the court's orders. (ECF No. 95).

         On March 8, 2017, Poshbaby filed a response to the court's order to show cause. (ECF No. 96). The response, however, fails to set forth any cause as to the parties' failure to prosecute the matter or any explanation justifying their failure to comply with the court's orders.

         II. Legal Standard & Discussion

          It is well established that the district courts have the inherent power to control their dockets. Ready Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir.1998)). “Indeed, the inherent powers permit a district court to go as far as to dismiss entire actions to rein in abusive conduct.” Id. (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 146 F.3d at 1074 as “recognizing inherent power to dismiss an action to sanction abusive conduct such as judge-shopping or failure to prosecute”).

         Dismissal for failure to obey a court order is a harsh penalty and should be imposed only in extreme circumstances. See Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987). In determining whether to dismiss a case for failing to comply with a court order, courts weigh the following five factors: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the [opposing party]; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” In re Phynylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

         “These factors are not a series of conditions precedent before the judge can do anything, but a way for the district judge to think about what to do.” Id. (citing Valley Eng'rs v. Elec. Eng'g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998)). Although preferred, it is not required that the district court make explicit findings to show that it has considered these factors. Id. A dismissal sanction will be overturned only if the reviewing court is left with “a definite and firm conviction that it was clearly outside the acceptable range of sanctions.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

         A. (1) Expeditious Resolution & (2) Court's Need to Manage Its Docket

         The first factor, “[o]rderly and expeditious resolution of disputes[, ] is of great importance to the rule of law. By the same token, delay in reaching the merits, whether by way of settlement or adjudication, is costly in money, memory, manageability, and ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.