United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is defendant MDGGG Trust's motion to
dismiss plaintiff CitiMortgage, Inc.'s claims against it,
as asserted in plaintiffs second amended complaint. (ECF No.
58). Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 71), and no reply
litigation involves the circumstances regarding the May 28,
2014, foreclosure sale of the real property at 9680 Blue
Calico Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada. (ECF Nos. 55, 71). The
instant defendant is the purchaser of the property at that
foreclosure sale. (ECF No. 55). As to this defendant, the
second amended complaint asserts the following claims: (1)
declaratory relief; (2) wrongful foreclosure; and (3) unjust
court may dismiss a plaintiffs complaint for "failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide
"[a] short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). Although rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, it does require more than labels and
conclusions. Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007). Furthermore, a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (citation omitted).
Rule 8 does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff
armed with nothing more than conclusions. Id. at
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to "state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face." Id. A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Id. When a complaint pleads facts that are merely
consistent with a defendant's liability, and shows only a
mere possibility of entitlement, the complaint does not meet
the requirements to show plausibility of entitlement to
Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step
approach district courts are to apply when considering a
motion to dismiss. Id. First, the court must accept
as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint.
However, this requirement is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Id. Second, only a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss. Id. at 678. Where the complaint does not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has "alleged - but not shown -
that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at
679. When the allegations in a complaint have not crossed the
line from conceivable to plausible, plaintiffs claim must be
dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Ninth Circuit addressed post-Iqbal pleading
standards in Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th
Cir. 2011). The Starr court held:
First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth,
allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply
recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain
sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair
notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken
as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such
that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be
subjected to the expense of discovery and continued
initial matter, plaintiff cannot make a claim of unjust
enrichment under its alleged facts against this defendant.
"Unjust enrichment is the 'unjust retention of a
benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice or equity and good conscience.'" Galvan
v. J.C.H. Enters., Inc., 2011 WL 4501083, No.
2:ll-cv-00307-RLH-GWF, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2011)
(quoting Asphalt Prods. Corp. v. All Star Ready Mix,
898 P.2d 699, 701 (Nev. 1995)). To state a valid claim for
unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege three elements:
(1) plaintiff conferred a benefit on defendant; (2) defendant
appreciated such benefit; and (3) defendant accepted and
retained the benefit. Id. (citing Topaz Mutual
Co. v. Marsh, 839 P.2d 606, 613 (Nev. 1992)).
this defendant, plaintiffs allegations under this claim are
merely that "MDGGG has accepted and retained the benefit
of CMI's payment of the property taxes assessed to the
Subject Property as well as the efforts to maintain and
preserve the Subject Property." (ECF No. 55 at 12).
Plaintiff gives no indication of the pecuniary amount,
applicable tax periods, the authority delineating these
obligations, a description of what these "efforts"
entail, or any other facts that would elevate this allegation