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JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC

United States District Court, D. Nevada

February 28, 2017

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff,
v.
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, et al., Defendants.

          ORDER

          JAMES C. MAHAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Presently before the court is defendant Independence II Homeowners Association's (the “HOA”) motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 14). Plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan”) filed a response (ECF No. 19), to which the HOA replied (ECF No. 29).

         Also before the court is defendant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC's (“SFR”) motion to certify a question of law to the Nevada Supreme Court. (ECF No. 25). JPMorgan filed a response (ECF No. 32), to which SFR replied (ECF No. 35).

         I. Facts

         This case involves a dispute over property located at 9233 Nerone Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 (the “property”) that was subject to a homeowners' association superpriority lien for delinquent assessment fees.

         On September 7, 2012, SFR purchased the property at a foreclosure sale for $4, 400.00, and a trustee's deed in favor of SFR was recorded on September 11, 2012. (ECF No. 1).

         On September 7, 2016, JPMorgan filed the underlying complaint against SFR and the HOA, alleging three causes of action: (1) declaratory relief; (2) quiet title; and (3) unjust enrichment. (ECF No. 1).

         In the instant motions, the HOA moves to dismiss JPMorgan's claims against it as time-barred, for failure to mediate pursuant to NRS 38.310, and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 14); SFR moves to certify a question of law (ECF No. 25). The court will address each in turn.

         II. Legal Standards

         A. Motion to Dismiss

         A court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a] short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).

         “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

         In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 678-79. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678.

         Second, the court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678.

         Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged-but not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the allegations in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, plaintiff's claim must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

         The Ninth Circuit addressed post-Iqbal pleading standards in Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The ...


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