United States District Court, D. Nevada
C . MAHAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the court is defendant Federal National Mortgage
Association (“Fannie Mae”) and counter-claimant
Federal Housing Finance Agency's (“FHFA”)
motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 38). Counter-defendant
Saticoy Bay LLC Series 10250 Sun Dusk Ln
(“Saticoy”) filed a response (ECF No. 40), and
movants filed a reply (ECF No. 41).
February 9, 2015, Alessi & Koenig, LLC submitted a
complaint in interpleader in Nevada state court, and Fannie
Mae removed that case to this court on April 29,
2015. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1). The case involves the
September 3, 2014, foreclosure of the real property at 10250
Sun Disk Lane, Las Vegas, Nevada. (ECF No. 1-1).
20, 2015, this court granted a stipulation allowing FHFA to
intervene as conservator of Fannie Mae. (ECF No. 17). On July
22, 2015, FHFA answered the complaint and asserted two
counterclaims against Saticoy and Sunset Mesa Community
Association (the “HOA”). (ECF No. 18).
FHFA requests declaratory judgment against Saticoy and the
HOA that Fannie Mae's interest in the deed of trust is
not extinguished because FHFA “has succeeded by law to
all of Fannie Mae's ‘rights, title, powers, and
privileges.'” (ECF No. 18 at 8) (quoting 12 U.S.C.
§ 4617(b)(2)(A)(i)). Therefore, it alleges, the property
at issue cannot be subject to foreclosure in light of 12
U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3)'s preemption of state law.
(Id.); see 12 U.S.C. § 4502 (defining
“Agency” in that chapter as
“[FHFA]”). Second, FHFA moves to quiet tile as to
the underlying property under that same authority. (ECF No.
18). Fannie Mae and FHFA's instant motion mirrors these
arguments. (ECF No. 38).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims . . . .” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
non-moving party must “set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, the court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden
Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000).
Moreover, “[i]n such a case, the moving party has the
initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue
of fact on each issue material to its case.”
contrast, when the non-moving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the non-moving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the non-moving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
motion for summary judgment, FHFA argues that §
4617(j)(3) of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
(“HERA”) preempts Nevada law and bars the
foreclosure of the relevant property without the consent of
the conservator: FHFA. (ECF No. 38). Thus, Fannie Mae and
FHFA argue that they are entitled to summary judgment ...