United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. Navarro, Chief Judge United States District Judge
before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 35),
filed by Defendant National Staff Organization-Nevada
(“NSO-Nevada”). Plaintiff Jaime Reborn
(“Plaintiff”)filed a Response, (ECF No. 40),
NSO-Nevada filed a Reply, (ECF No. 41).
before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 36),
filed by Defendant Nevada State Education Association
(“NSEA”). Plaintiff filed a Response, (ECF No.
39), and NSEA filed a Reply, (ECF No. 42). For the reasons
discussed below, the Court GRANTS both NSEA and
NSO-Nevada's (collectively “Defendants”)
Motions to Dismiss.
case centers upon allegations that Defendants breached the
collective bargaining agreement governing the terms of
Plaintiff's employment. (See Compl. 10:12-3, ECF
No. 1; NSEA MTD, 2:16-18, ECF No. 5). Plaintiff alleges that
until December 31, 2012, he was an employee of NSEA and a
member of NSO-Nevada, the “union that represent[s] NSEA
non-management staff members.” (Compl. 1:26-2:5).
Plaintiff alleges that on August 13, 2012, he applied for a
Director of Communications position with NSEA. (Id.
2:8-10). According to Plaintiff, NSEA
“unbelievably” responded “that [his]
qualifications did not merit and [sic] interview for Director
of Communications.” (Id. 2:14-15). Plaintiff
alleges “that [he] knew, without question, that [he]
was qualified for the position.” (Id.
on NSEA's failure to interview Plaintiff for the Director
of Communications position, Plaintiff alleges that on
September 13, 2012, he “officially asked [NSO-Nevada],
via email, to file a grievance on [his] behalf.”
(Id. 3:16-19). Subsequently, on December 31, 2012,
NSEA allegedly eliminated Plaintiff's position and
terminated his employment. (Id. 7:6-9). Plaintiff
alleges he “continued to pay union dues to NSO-Nevada
until [his] last day as an official employee of NSEA.”
(Id. 7:22-23). Plaintiff further alleges that
“NSO-Nevada took no actions to fight for [his] job . .
. nor did the NSO-Nevada take any actions [sic] to fight for
[his] request to interview for the Director of Communications
[position].” (Id. 7:19-21).
on these allegations, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against
both Defendants, asserting claims for: (1) breach of
contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; and (3) breach of fiduciary duty. (Id.
22:4-28:22). Each Defendant subsequently filed Motions to
Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff's claims are (1)
preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”), 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185, (2) subject
to the statute of limitations therein, and (3) therefore
untimely. (See Mots. to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 5, 9).
Court agreed that Plaintiff's claims “are clearly
preempted [by the LMRA] and subject to the six-month statute
of limitations.” (Order 5:23, ECF No. 30). Because
“Plaintiff's claims accrued no later than December
31, 2012” and “Plaintiff . . . did not file his
Complaint until October 21, 2015, ” the Court
determined that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred.
(Id. 6:1- 5). Further, the Court rejected
Plaintiff's argument that the statute of limitations
should be tolled because the Defendants engaged in
“fraudulent concealment” when they
“concealed” from Plaintiff that the individual to
whom NSEA offered the Director of Communications position,
Nick DiArchangel (“DiArchangel”), did not have a
master's degree at the time of his hire. (Resp. to
NSO-Nevada MTD 2:20-21, ECF No. 15; Resp. to NSEA MTD
1:22-23, ECF No. 14). The Court explained:
[T]here is no plausible basis for such tolling in the instant
case. Plaintiff's allegation of fraudulent concealment
has no bearing on NSO-Nevada's failure to initiate a
grievance or NSEA's failures to “fully vet[
Plaintiff's] application” or “allow[
Plaintiff] to interview for the Director of Communications
position.” (Compl. 22:23-25). Accordingly, even
assuming Defendants concealed DiArchangel's job
qualifications, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any reason to
toll the six-month statute of limitations.
Court therefore dismissed Plaintiff's claims as
time-barred, but granted Plaintiff leave to amend “to
allege facts demonstrating that tolling is
appropriate.” (Id. 7:14-20). In the instant
Motions to Dismiss, Defendants argue Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”), (ECF No. 34), again
fails to allege any viable exceptions to the LMRA's
statute of limitations.
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates
that a court dismiss a cause of action that fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. See North Star
Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d
578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). When considering a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim,
dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not
give the defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim
and the grounds on which it rests. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering
whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the
Court will take all material allegations as true and construe
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See NL
Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.
Court, however, is not required to accept as true allegations
that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact,
or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). A formulaic
recitation of a cause of action with conclusory allegations
is not sufficient; a plaintiff must plead facts showing that
a violation is plausible, not just possible.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (emphasis added). In order
to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. “A claim ...