United States District Court, D. Nevada
FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, in its capacity as Conservator of Federal National Mortgage Association and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION; and FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Plaintiffs,
LAS VEGAS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC; LAS VEGAS DEVELOPMENT, LLC; and LVDG, LLC, Defendants.
M. Navarro Chief Judge.
before the Court is the Motion to Reassign the Case, (ECF No.
19), filed by Defendant Las Vegas Development Group
(“Defendant”). Plaintiffs Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, Federal Housing Finance Agency, and
Federal National Mortgage Association (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 26), and
Defendant filed a Reply, (ECF No. 27). For the reasons
discussed below, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion.
case arises from Defendant's severance from a case
previously before this Court. See Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency
v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 2016 WL 2350121 (D. Nev.
May 2, 2016). There, the Court severed the claims asserted
against Defendant and provided Plaintiffs until May 26, 2016,
to file a separate case against Defendant. Id. at
*7. Moreover, the Court held that once the new case was
filed, “the Clerk of Court will assign [it] to the
undersigned district judge and Magistrate Judge Carl W.
filed their Complaint against Defendant on May 26, 2016.
(See Compl., ECF No. 1). Defendant filed the instant
Motion acknowledging that this “action has been
assigned to this Court by the Clerk of Court by virtue of the
Order in Case No. 15-cv-1338-GMN-CWH.” (Mot. to
Reassign 7:21-22, ECF No. 19). Still, Defendant contests the
assignment as a violation of the General Order no. 2011-05 of
the United States District Court for the District of Nevada
that states that cases are to be assigned to judges randomly.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure directly governs reassignment
of actions from one United States District Judge to another,
although Rule 1 states that, as a general matter, the Rules
“should be construed and administrated to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Similarly, few cases
have considered the merits of such a reassignment, and the
majority of the cases that seek reassignment are based on an
allegation of judicial bias. See, e.g., Keith v.
Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988); Wilkinson v.
Lewis, 958 F.2d 380, 1992 WL 51344 (9th Cir. Mar. 18,
1992) (citing Volpe).
establish entitlement to reassignment, a party must show that
a proposed judge has specific and recent experience with the
law in question. See Straus Family Creamery v.
Lyons, 219 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1048-49 (N. D. Cal. 2002)
(declining to reassign a case to a judge who had issued a
summary judgment ruling on the same statute in a legally
related case three years before). Generally, reassignment has
been ultimately reserved for only the most complex of cases
that already consume “tremendous judicial
resources.” In re Industrial Gas Antitrust
Litigation, 1985 WL 2869, at *6 (N. D. Ill. 1985)
(finding that judicial economy was furthered by reassigning a
case involving 172, 000 class plaintiffs in a complex
antitrust matter over which the judge had been presiding for
instant Motion, Defendant premises its entire argument on the
case not being “randomly assigned.” (Mot. to.
Reassign 7:26, ECF No. 19). Defendant asserts, “[t]he
assignment of this case to this Court is in violation of
General Order no. 2011-05, which specifically requires that
the assignment of newly filed cases shall be random. No
randomness occurred herein, with the Clerk of Court assigning
the instant case to this Court based upon the order entered
in Case No. 15-cv-1338-GMN-CWH.” (Id. 8:1-3).
Indeed, the Court previously held that Defendant's case
would be assigned “to the undersigned district judge
and Magistrate Judge Carl W. Hoffman.” Fed. Hous.
Fin. Agency, 2016 WL 2350121, at *7 (hereinafter
“the stem case”).
so, Defendant does not explain why the instant case should be
reassigned other than repetitively alleging that reassignment
is necessary because it was not done randomly. (Mot. to.
Reassign 7:26-8:3). The Court is well aware the assignment
was not random because the Court specifically
instructed this procedure in the stem case. See Fed.
Hous. Fin. Agency, 2016 WL 2350121, at *7. Further, the
Court is within its right to do so pursuant to promoting
judicial economy as this Court has the most experience with
the specific legal issues, facts, and parties in
question. See, e.g., Japan Cash Mach.
Co. v. MEI, Inc., 2008 WL 5051245, at *6 (Nov. 20, 2008)
(“Judicial economy encompasses many rationales, but the
controlling interest behind the concept involves ‘sound
judicial administration.'”) (quoting
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521
F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1975)).
Defendant argues that the Court is in violation of General
Order no. 2011-05, the Court remains compliant as the General
Order states in relevant part that cases are randomly
assigned “at the direction of and with the approval of
the Court.” (General Order in the Matter of the
Assignment of Civil and Criminal Cases (2011)). Moreover,
pursuant to Local Rule 42-1, this case is related to the stem
case and reassignment “would entail substantial
duplication of labor if the actions were heard by different
district judges or magistrate judges.” L.R. 42-1(a)(5).
In the stem case, the Court found that the certification of
the class was not appropriate. See Fed. Hous. Fin.
Agency, 2016 WL 2350121, at *4. Although the Court did
not certify the class, the filing of a class action operates
similarly to a notice of related cases. As such, substantial
duplication of efforts would occur if the severed, related
cases-such as Defendant's-were assigned to a different
fails to demonstrate why this case should not be in this
Court and why reassignment to another judge would result in a
more expeditious trial. Defendant's generalized
complaints, without more, are therefore insufficient to
demonstrate how reassignment would ...