United States District Court, D. Nevada
J. KOPPE United States Magistrate Judge
is proceeding in this action pro se and requested
authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in
forma pauperis. Docket No. 1. On July 20, 2016, the
Court granted Plaintiff's application, and screened
Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Docket No. 4. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint
with leave to amend. Id. The Court identified
numerous deficiencies in Plaintiff's complaint, and
provided him an opportunity to cure those defects. See
has now filed an amended complaint, which he frames as an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Docket No. 6. Plaintiff
contests the decision of three police officers to seize his
vehicle, as well as Defendant Fast Tow, Inc.'s subsequent
involvement in towing and impounding it. See, e.g.,
id. at 3, 6. It appears that Plaintiff is
challenging a seizure that occurred in connection with a
traffic citation. Id. at 3. In his amended
complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Baker ticketed
Plaintiff for a traffic violation, but that Defendant
“Baker's charges were dismissed because he
didn't show up.” Id.
Court construes Count I of the amended complaint as
attempting to allege a § 1983 claim for deprivation of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant
Baker. See Id. at 4. To state a claim under §
1983, a plaintiff must allege that a right secured by the
Constitution or statutory law has been violated, and the
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
law. See Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067
(9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff meets these basic requirements by
identifying a constitutional amendment and alleging that
Defendant Baker acted under color of law as a police officer.
Id. at 2-3. However, the Court must also examine
whether Plaintiff states a claim against Defendant Baker
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
relies primarily on the conclusory assertion that Defendant
Baker “took away [his] notice and opportunity [t]o
defend the seizure in court.” Id. at 4.
Plaintiff also notes that Defendant Baker failed to fill out
or provide some forms. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff's
conclusory assertion fails to satisfy the pleading
requirements. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stating that although Rule 8 does
not require detailed factual allegations, it demands
“more than labels and conclusions”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against
Court construes Count II as attempting to allege a §
1983 claim for deprivation of Plaintiff's procedural due
process rights against Defendant Fast Tow, Inc. See
Docket No. 6 at 5. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fast Tow,
Inc. violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and that it worked
in concert with the state. See Id. The Fourth
Amendment applies to searches and seizures, not procedural
due process. Moreover, Plaintiff's factual allegations
are again vague and limited. See Id. Thus, Plaintiff
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
against Defendant Fast Tow, Inc.
Plaintiff cites a variety of other authorities in isolation.
See, e.g., id. at 2 (referring to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and
1986);id. at 4 (quoting the Nevada Constitution). As
the Court previously explained, even liberally construing
Plaintiff's complaint, bald citations of authority do not
satisfy Rule 8. Docket No. 4 at 3. Additionally, Plaintiff
makes conclusory assertions regarding an alleged conspiracy
between Defendants John Doe #1 and John Doe #2. Docket No. 6
at 3. These assertions do not satisfy the pleading
requirements. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted against these defendants. The Court gives
Plaintiff one final opportunity to cure the deficiencies in
IT IS ORDERED, for the reasons stated above,
that the amended complaint is DISMISSED,
with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have until
February 23, 2017, to file a second amended
complaint, if Plaintiff believes he can cure the noted
deficiencies. If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended
complaint, he is advised that an amended complaint supersedes
(replaces) the original complaint and, thus, the second
amended complaint must be complete in itself. See Hal
Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc.,
896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
“[t]he fact that a party was named in the original
complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the
original”); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty.,
693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that for claims
dismissed with prejudice, a plaintiff is not required to
reallege such claims in a subsequent amended complaint to
preserve them for appeal). Plaintiffs second amended
complaint must contain all claims, defendants, and factual
allegations that Plaintiff wishes to pursue in this lawsuit.
Failure to comply with this Order will result in the
recommended dismissal of this case, without prejudice.
 The Court, notes, however, that
Plaintiff asserted in his initial complaint that he was found
guilty of a traffic ...