JERRION M. HALEY, Plaintiff,
ROBERT ARNOLD et al., Defendants.
Order Plaintiff, who is a prisoner in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), has submitted a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion to have the court clerk electronically serve defendants. (Dkt. # 1-1, 5, 7.) The matter of the filing fee shall be temporarily deferred. The Court now screens Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I. SCREENING STANDARD
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a federal court must dismiss a prisoner’s claim, if “the allegation of poverty is untrue, ” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id.
Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may therefore be dismissed sua sponte if the prisoner’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
In the complaint, Plaintiff sues multiple defendants for events that took place while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Southern Desert Correctional Center (“SDCC”). (Dkt. #1-1 at 1). Plaintiff sues Defendants Correctional Officer Robert Arnold, Hearing Officer/Lieutenant R. Kozloff, and Correctional Officer Ronald Oliver. (Id. at 1-2). Plaintiff alleges three counts and seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary damages. (Id. at 3, 6, 9).
A. Counts I and II
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges the following: Disciplinary hearing officer Oliver would not call Plaintiff’s witnesses. (Dkt. #1-1 at 4). Prison officials put Plaintiff in administrative segregation even though he has a right to an adversarial hearing before being placed into administrative segregation. (Id.) Administrative segregation was exceptionally harsh. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges a due process violation. (Id.)
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges the following: Plaintiff was found guilty of disciplinary charges. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff is entitled to a written statement by fact finders regarding the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. (Id.) Hearing officers Barth and Oliver did not provide any explanations for the conclusions they reached. (Id.) They did not provide any reasons for believing the written reports of the officers over Plaintiff’s personal testimony. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges due process violations. (Id.).
As an initial matter, although Plaintiff states that he was sent to administrative segregation, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s allegations as stating that he had been sent to disciplinary segregation. Prison officials may send an inmate to administrative segregation without an adversarial hearing. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (holding that when a prisoner is placed in administrative segregation, prison officials must, within a reasonable time after the prisoner’s placement, conduct an informal, non-adversary review of the evidence justifying the decision to segregate the prisoner). The Court analyzes Plaintiff’s claims under the disciplinary segregation standard.
In order to state a cause of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995). In Sandin, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner has a liberty interest when confinement “imposes [an] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. In Sandin, the Supreme Court focused on three factors in determining that the plaintiff possessed no liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) disciplinary segregation was essentially the same as discretionary forms of segregation; (2) a comparison between the plaintiff’s confinement and conditions ...