Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Cabrera v. Clark County Detention Center

United States District Court, District of Nevada

April 20, 2015

CHARLES M. CABRERA, Plaintiff,
v.
CLARK COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, et. al., Defendants.

ORDER

C.W. Hoffman, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Charles M. Cabrera’s (“plaintiff”) motion to strike initial expert disclosure statement (doc. # 114), filed February 9, 2015, and Defendant Naphcare, Inc.’s (“defendant”) response (doc. # 117), filed February 23, 2015. Plaintiff did not file a reply

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is a prisoner in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections and currently incarcerated at the High Desert State Prison. On July 19, 2012, the Court granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Doc. # 3. The Court also entered a screening order finding that plaintiff had pled facts sufficient to support his Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs, and Fourteenth Amendment claim for due process. Id. Thereafter, the Court granted defendant a shortened discovery period of sixty (60) days, during which defendant served plaintiff an initial expert disclosure statement, along with supplements to that disclosure statement. See Docs. # 106, #117-1, # 117-2. In the instant motion, plaintiff asks the Court to strike defendant’s initial disclosure statement because of various purported failures. See Doc. # 114.

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) requires a party to disclose to the opposing party the “identity of any witness it may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(A). Generally, the disclosure of expert testimony is intended to allow the opposing party to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare for effective cross-examination and arrange for expert testimony from other witnesses. See Adv. Comm. Notes to 1993 Amendments. The federal rules contemplate two classes of experts: (1) those “retained or specially employed” to give expert testimony in a case, and (2) those who are not retained or specially employed but, nevertheless, may provide expert testimony. See Elgas v. Colorado Belle Corp., 179 F.R.D. 296, 298 (D. Nev. 1998) (citing Piper v Harnischfeger Corp., 170 F.R.D. 173, 174 (D. Nev. 1997)). For experts “retained or specially employed, ” the disclosure requirements are as follows:

(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them;
(ii) the facts considered by the witness in forming them;
(iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them;
(iv) the witness’s qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years;
(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and
(vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.