ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SURREPLY
RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
On June 25, 2013, Plaintiff National Default Servicing Corporation (“NDSC”) filed suit in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada against Defendants Internal Revenue Service, an agency of the United States of America; Baycliff Creeks Homeowners Association; Diedre S. Holland; Does 1 through 10; and Roe Business Entities 1 through 10. ECF No. 1-1. NDSC claimed that certain real property was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale that generated proceeds greater than the debt obligation owed to the beneficiary of the foreclosing deed of trust. NDSC alleged two causes of action: 1) interpleader of funds and 2) declaratory relief pursuant to Nevada Revised Statute 30.040. No Doe or Roe defendants were substituted.
On July 24, 2013, the United States petitioned to remove the case to this Court on the basis of 28 U.S.C. sections 1442 and 1444 jurisdiction. ECF No. 1.
On December 10, 2013, the Clerk of Court entered default as to Defendants Baycliff Creeks Homeowners Association and Diedre S. Holland for failure to plead or otherwise defend. ECF No. 19.
On April 1, 2014, NDSC filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 23.
On April 22, the United States filed its Response. ECF No. 24. On May 9, NDSC filed its Reply. ECF No. 25.
On May 16, 2014, the United States filed the instant Motion for Leave to File a Sur-Reply. ECF No. 26. In this motion, the United States claimed that NDSC’s Reply introduced “new evidence that shows both that Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment, and that the United States is entitled to summary judgment.” Mot. for Leave to File a Sur-Reply 1:24–25. The United States further claims relevant documents were produced to it on April 25, 2014, after the United States had filed its Response. Id. at 3. NDSC did not opposed the motion for sur-reply.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When considering the propriety of summary judgment, the court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2011).
If the movant has carried its burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, “[i]f a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything, ” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000).
To carry its burden of production, the moving party must identify particular portions of the pleadings or evidence on file that it “believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Thus, the moving party must satisfy Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), which states that the movant must support its assertions by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” “A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).
A. Motion for Summary Judgment