ORDER & JUDGMENT [21, 31, 43]
Jennifer Dorsey United States District Judge
Lonnie Lassenbby was attacked by a dog at Frank Davidson’s home. He obtained a judgment against Davidson and is trying to collect that judgment from a State Farm Fire and Casualty Company rental dwelling policy issued to the owner of Davidson’s home—his deceased parent’s trust—under the theory that Davidson is a named insured under the policy so Lassenbby’s claims against Davidson should have been covered. Doc. 1-1. Lassenbby and State Farm filed cross motions for summary judgment in which Lassenbby insists that Davison is an insured and beneficiary of the policy, and State Farm takes the diametrically opposed stance that Davidson enjoys no coverage under the policy whatsoever. Docs. 21, 31. Because I find that Davison is not an insured under the unambiguous language of the policy and the undisputed facts of this case, I grant State Farm’s motion, deny Lassenbby’s, and enter judgment on all claims against Lassenbby.
The court finds that the following facts are undisputed:
1. On October 27, 1992, the Davidson Family Trust was established by agreement.
2. Frank Davison is a beneficiary of the trust, but he is not a trustee. Carol Hollandsworth is the trust’s sole trustee.
3. On November 10, 2007, Frank Davidson was living in the home located at 981 Apache Lane in Las Vegas, Nevada. The home was an asset of, and owned by, the trust.
4. State Farm Fire and Casualty issued a Rental Dwelling Policy, Policy Number 98-CS-0813-1 for the home. The policy was issued to the trust and its trustee Hollandsworth.
5. The policy language defines “Insured” for purposes of the instant policy as only the trust itself and any trustees. Doc. 21 at 25, ¶ 4(c).
6. The policy does not list trust beneficiaries as insureds under the policy.
7. I heard oral argument on these motions on December 11, 2014, and placed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record; I incorporate those findings and conclusions herein.
Conclusions of Law
1. Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). A movant satisfies this burden by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c).
2. Any dispute regarding a material issue of fact must be genuine: the evidence must be such that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial” and summary judgment ...