Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Brown v. Southern Nevada Adult Mental Health Services

United States District Court, D. Nevada

June 20, 2014



JAMES C. MAHAN, District Judge.

Presently before the court is a motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff James Flavy Coy Brown. (Doc. # 56). Defendants filed a response in opposition, (doc. # 58), and plaintiff filed a reply, (doc. # 60).

I. Background

This case revolves around allegations that plaintiff and other similarly situated former patients at Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hospital ("Rawson-Neal") were involuntarily discharged by defendants and instructed to travel to out-of-state destinations where defendants allegedly knew they would be unable to obtain proper treatment, care, and housing. Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent were allegedly given anti-psychotic medication before they were discharged from the facility.

Allegedly, Rawson-Neal staff physically escorted defendant and other patients from the facility to waiting taxis bound for the Greyhound Bus Station in Las Vegas, Nevada. They were directed to travel on pre-paid tickets which had been provided by defendant Southern Nevada Adult Mental Health Services ("SNAMHS").

Specifically, plaintiff claims that he was admitted to Rawson-Neal on February 9, 2013, due to psychosis and suicidal thoughts. The staff at Rawson-Neal cared for plaintiff for approximately two days, during which they administered Thorazine, Cymbalta, and Klonopin. On February 11, 2013, the staff discharged plaintiff involuntarily, physically escorted him from the facility, and took him to a taxi which transported him to the Greyhound bus station.

Prior to his discharge, the staff allegedly gave plaintiff a pre-paid ticket to Sacramento, California, and instructed him to travel there but did not make arrangements for psychiatric care or secure assistance of any kind upon his arrival. The staff is also alleged to have given plaintiff enough medication to last for the approximately fifteen-hour bus ride.

After plaintiff arrived in Sacramento, he was taken by the police to a local homeless service center, which could provide no housing, medical treatment, or transportation. He was then directed to the University of California at Davis Medical Center's emergency department which, after three days, arranged for plaintiff to be treated at a local psychiatric facility. From there he was discharged to a group home in Sacramento.

On February 13, 2014, the court dismissed plaintiff's constitutional and federal-statutory claims without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims arising under Nevada state law. (Doc. # 54). Plaintiff now requests that the court reconsider its dismissal of the constitutional and federal-statutory claims in this matter.

II. Legal standard

Plaintiff appears to be moving under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). But the court does not find application of Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) appropriate here. The court's order was not a judgment. It did not dismiss any of plaintiff's claims with prejudice. The court, in fairness, construes the motion as a motion to reconsider pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides that any interlocutory order "may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities." Accordingly, "[w]here reconsideration of a non-final order is sought, the court has inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter or revoke it." Goodman v. Platinum Condo. Dev., LLC, 2012 WL 1190827, at *1 (D. Nev. 2012); see also City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 2001) (a district court "possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient."); United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000); Glavor v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 879 F.Supp. 1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("District courts are authorized to reconsider interlocutory orders at any time prior to final judgment.").

"Reconsideration may be appropriate if a district court: (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) there has been an intervening change in controlling law." Rich v. TASER Int'l, Inc., 917 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1094 (D. Nev. 2013); see also Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 807-08 (9th Cir. 2004); School Dist. No. IJ, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1236 (1994).

While a motion for reconsideration allows a party to bring a material oversight to the court's attention, it is not appropriate for a party to request reconsideration merely to force the court to "think about [an] issue again in the hope that [it] will come out the other way the second time." Teller v. Dogge, 2013 WL 508326, at *6 n. 6 (D. Nev. 2013); see also Palmer v. Champion Mortgage, 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006).

III. ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.