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Glazing Health and Welfare Fund v. Accuracy Glass & Mirror Co., Inc.

United States District Court, D. Nevada

June 19, 2014

GLAZING HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
ACCURACY GLASS & MIRROR COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants.

ORDER

KENT J. DAWSON, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants Accuracy Glass & Mirror Co. ("Accuracy"), Michael A. Lamek ("Lamek"), and Kelly D. Marshall's ("Marshall") (collectively "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (#9). Also before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (#17). Plaintiffs Glazing Health and Welfare Fund, et al. ("Plaintiffs") filed a response in opposition (#20), to which Defendants replied (#22). Also before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Western National Mutual Insurance Co. ("Western National") (#63). Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (#89). Also before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Default against Aegis Security Insurance Company ("Aegis") (#72) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (#73).

I. Background

Accuracy is a Nevada glass and glazing contractor (#13). Lamek is Accuracy's secretary/treasurer and Marshall is its president (#13). Plaintiffs are a collection of trusts that manage participating employees' benefits in southern Nevada (#13). Accuracy entered into a Master Labor Agreement ("MLA") and several Trust Agreements with Glaziers Union Local 2001 (#17). Plaintiffs allege that Accuracy failed to meet the contribution obligations required by the MLA and Trust Agreements (#13).

II. Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss

In considering a motion to dismiss, "all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. , 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Consequently, there is a strong presumption against dismissing an action for failure to state a claim. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp. , 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Plausibility, in the context of a motion to dismiss, means that a plaintiff has pleaded facts which allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.

The Iqbal evaluation illustrates a two prong analysis. First, the Court identifies the allegations which are legal conclusions, bare assertions, or merely conclusory. Id. at 1949-51. Second, the Court determines if the remaining factual allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. at 1951. If the allegations state plausible claims for relief, the claims survive the motion to dismiss. Id. at 1950.

III. Analysis

A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' injunctive relief claim, Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract claim against Marshall and Lamek, and Plaintiffs' Breach of Fiduciary Duty claim. Plaintiffs assert that Marshall and Lamek are both individually liable for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs also argue that their injunctive relief claim was designed to put Defendants on notice that Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in the current case, as required by FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(1).

1. Injunctive Relief

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' cause of action for injunctive relief. Defendants argue that injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs are only entitled to injunctive relief if they prevail on their claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.

Plaintiffs do not contend that their cause of action for injunctive relief is, in fact, a cause of action. Instead, Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to injunctive relief under ERISA. Plaintiffs also argue that the cause of action for injunctive relief fulfills the notice requirement of FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(1).

An injunction is not a cause of action. First 100, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2:13-CV-431-JCM-PAL, 2013 WL 3678111 (D. Nev. 2013). It is a form of relief, and is an exercise of a court's equitable authority. See Salazar v. Buono , 559 U.S. 700, 714-15 (2010). Plaintiffs' cause of action for injunctive relief (1) refers to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim and (2) asserts that Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief. It does not contain a distinct substantive claim that warrants a new cause of action. Consequently, the Court grants the ...


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