United States District Court, D. Nevada
BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, a North Carolina banking corporation, Plaintiff,
YOEL INY; NOAM SCHWARTZ; YOEL INY, Trustee of the Y&T INY FAMILY TRUST dated June 8, 1994, as amended; NOAM SCHWARTZ, Trustee of the NOAM SCHWARTZ TRUST dated August 19, 1999; D.M.S.I., LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. YOEL INY; NOAM SCHWARTZ; YOEL INY, Trustee of the Y&T INY FAMILY TRUST dated June 8, 1994, as amended; NOAM SCHWARTZ, Trustee of the NOAM SCHWARTZ TRUST dated August 19, 1999; and D.M.S.I., LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, Counterclaimants.
LARRY R. HICKS, District Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff Branch Banking and Trust Company's ("Branch Banking") Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims. Doc. #16. Defendants Yoel Iny; Noam Schwartz; Yoel Iny, trustee of the Y&T Family Trust dated June 8, 1994, as amended; Noam Schwartz, trustee of the Noam Schwartz Trust dated August 19, 1999; and D.M.S.I., LLC (collectively "Defendants") filed a Response (Doc. #20) to which Branch Banking replied (Doc. #22).
I. Facts and Background
This action arises out of White Beauty Development, LLC's (the "Borrower") alleged default on a secured loan agreement. Doc. #1, Ex. 1, Ex. 2. Defendants executed a guarantee, the terms of which required Defendants to pay all amounts due under the secured loan agreement. Doc. #1, Ex. 3. Following the Borrower's default on the secured loan agreement and Defendants' failure to cure the default in payment, Branch Banking filed the present action for breach of guaranty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Defendants. Doc. #1. On June 27, 2013, Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim against Branch Banking asserting claims for breach of oral contract and promissory estoppel. Doc. #14. Therein, Defendants allege that they entered into an oral contract with Branch Banking, pursuant to which Branch Banking would "provide Defendants with adequate time and opportunity to propose and implement a real estate property action plan to address and work-out certain Colonial Bank loans (Work-Out Agreement')." Id. at ¶7. In reliance thereon, Defendants claim to have "expended many, many hours and substantial money, executing tasks in furtherance of the Work-Out Agreement, " and "submitted extensive financial information, documentation and proposed plan(s) to [Branch Banking]." Id. at ¶¶9-10. In return for this performance, Defendants allege that "[Branch Banking] orally agreed to forbear from enforcing certain rights under the [aforementioned loan]." Id. at ¶11. Branch Banking allegedly "breached the Work-Out Agreement by arbitrarily rejecting Defendants' proposal(s) and returning checks to Defendants which contained interest payments." Id. at ¶12. On July 17, 2013, Branch Banking filed the present Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims. Doc. #16.
II. Legal Standard
Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must satisfy the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) notice pleading standard. See Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). That is, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations; however, a pleading that offers "labels and conclusions' or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action'" will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Furthermore, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference, based on the Court's judicial experience and common sense, that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See id. at 678-79. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true. Id. However, "bare assertions... amount[ing] to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a... claim... are not entitled to an assumption of truth." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court discounts these allegations because "they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion-even if that conclusion is cast in the form of a factual allegation." Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, ' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Id.
A. First Cause of Action for Breach of Oral Contract
Branch Banking contends that the alleged oral contract at issue is void pursuant to the Nevada Statute of Frauds, which requires a writing for "[e]very agreement that, by the terms, is not to be performed within 1 year from the making thereof." Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.220(1). The Court agrees. Only those oral agreements which are capable of being fully performed within a year from execution are not void under the Statute of Frauds. See Stanley v. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., 60 Nev. 432, 112 P.2d 1047, 1052 (1941). The fact that performance exceeds one year does not render an agreement void where the terms therein do not indicate that it could not be performed within one year. See Atwell v. Sw. Secs., 107 Nev. 820, 820 P.2d 766, 769 (1991) (finding that verbal contract with indefinite duration was not void under Nevada's Statute of Frauds where there was nothing to indicate that it could not be fully performed within one year). Moreover, the Statute of Frauds does not encompass agreements that are "simply not likely to be performed, " or agreements that are "simply not expected to be performed, within the space of a year from the making." Stanley, 112 P.2d at 1052 (quoting Browne on the Statute of Frauds, Page 327, § 273, 4th Ed.). The statute does, however, apply to those agreements "[w]here the manifest intent and understanding of the parties, as gathered from the words used and the circumstances existing at the time [of execution], are that the contract shall not be executed within the year[.]" Stanley, 112 P.2d at 1052.
Here, it is manifest from the terms of the alleged agreement that Branch Banking could not have fully performed its obligations under the alleged agreement within one year. According to Defendants allegations, Branch Banking "agreed to forbear from enforcing certain rights under the [aforementioned loan]." Doc. #14, ¶11. Thus, in order for Branch Banking to fully perform under the alleged agreement, it could never exercise certain rights under the loan agreement. Because this provision plainly envisions that Branch Banking would have an indefinite obligation not to enforce certain rights, the agreement, by its terms, could not be fully performed in one year. Defendants' creative argument that the alleged oral contract had a term of one year, but was renewed yearly, does not rescue them from this conclusion.
In this regard, the Court agrees with the reasoning set forth in MGM Desert Inn, Inc. v. Shack, 809 F.Supp. 783 (D. Nev. 1993). Similarly there, the defendant alleged that the MGM orally "agreed to advance him money with which to gamble, he agreed to write them a check to cover this advance, but they agreed not to present this check for payment." Id. at 786. The defendant further argued that, by presenting his check for payment, the MGM had violated this oral contract. Id. There, the court found that Nevada's Statute of Frauds rendered the defendant's argument meritless. In essence, the MGM was not capable of fully performing its end of the bargain-not presenting the check for payment-within one year. Instead, MGM's alleged obligation not to present the check for payment endured indefinitely, and thus well beyond one year. For the same reasons, the Court finds that the Nevada's Statute of Frauds renders the alleged oral agreement between Branch Banking and Defendants void.
Moreover, while the alleged agreement does not explicitly set forth a specific time frame in which the real estate property action plan was to be executed, and it is conceivable that Defendants could have proposed and implemented a plan within one year, the circumstances suggest that it was not in the parties' contemplation at the time. See Stanley, 112 P.2d at 1052 ("[T]he possibility of performance which would take an agreement out of the statute of frauds must be such as could fairly and reasonably be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties. An unforeseen or remote possibility will not rescue the agreement from invalidity."). Here, Defendants' claim necessarily relies on an assertion that one year was not an "adequate time and opportunity to propose and implement a real estate property action plan." Doc. #14, ¶7. Defendants' admission in this regard strongly demonstrates that they did not anticipate or intend to fully ...