United States District Court, D. Nevada
DORIS L. THOMAS, Plaintiff,
CAROLYN COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
VALERIE P. COOKE, District Judge.
This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Howard D. McKibben, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and LR IB 1-4. Before the court is plaintiff's motion for remand and/or reversal (#15). Defendant filed a cross-motion to affirm (#17). For the reasons set forth below, the court recommends that plaintiff's motion for remand and/or reversal be denied, and defendant's cross-motion to affirm be granted.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Doris Lizette Taylor ("plaintiff") was a forty-nine-year-old woman with at least a high school education on the alleged disability date of March 15, 2009 (Administrative Record ("AR") 38, 47). On August 24, 2009, she filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II. Id. at 38. Defendant Commissioner denied plaintiff's application initially and on reconsideration. Id.
On October 19, 2011, plaintiff and her attorney appeared at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Eileen Burlison. Id. at 55-81. The ALJ followed the five-step sequential process for evaluating disability claims, set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, and issued a written decision on April 19, 2012, finding plaintiff had "not been disabled" pursuant to the Social Security Act at any time from the alleged onset date through the date of the ALJ's decision. Id. at 38-49. Plaintiff appealed, and the Appeals Council denied review. Id. at 1-28. Thus, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
On August 27, 2013, having exhausted all administrative remedies, plaintiff, through counsel, filed a complaint for judicial review (#1-1). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision was based on legal error, in that her determination of plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") and her credibility findings were not supported by substantial evidence in the record (#15, pp. 7-18). Accordingly, plaintiff asks the court to reverse or remand the ALJ's decision. Id. at 1.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court must affirm the ALJ's determination if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Stout v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive"). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance." Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005).
To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the court must look at the record as a whole, considering both evidence that supports and undermines the ALJ's decision. Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). "However, if evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, the decision of the ALJ must be upheld." Id. at 749 (citation omitted). The ALJ alone is responsible for determining credibility and for resolving ambiguities. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999).
The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected... to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months..." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A).
A. Five-Step Sequential Process
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1987). If at any step the Social Security Administration (SSA) can make a finding of disability or nondisability, a determination will be made and the SSA will not further review the claim. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003).
In the first step, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity"; if so, a finding of nondisability is made and the claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner proceeds to step two.
The second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant's impairment or combinations of impairments are "severe." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41. An impairment is severe if it significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. Id. Basic work activities are "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs[, ]" which include: "(1) [p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) [c]apacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) [u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) [u]se of judgment; (5) [r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (6) [d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. If a claimant's impairment is so slight that it causes no more than minimal functional limitations, the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). If, however, the Commissioner finds that the claimant's impairment is severe, the Commissioner proceeds to step three. Id.
In the third step, the Commissioner determines whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of specific impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1 ("Listed Impairments"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). The Commissioner presumes the Listed Impairments are severe enough to preclude any gainful activity, regardless of age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). If the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the Listed Impairments, and is of sufficient duration, the claimant is conclusively presumed disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). If the claimant's impairment is severe, but does not meet or equal one of the Listed Impairments, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141.
In step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can still perform "past relevant work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f). Past relevant work is that which a claimant performed in the last fifteen (15) years, which lasted long enough for him or her to learn to do it, and was substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565(a). The ALJ reviews the claimant's "residual functional capacity" ("RFC") and the physical and mental demands of the work previously performed. See id.; see also Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010). RFC is what the claimant can still do despite his or her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. In determining RFC, an ALJ must assess all evidence, including the claimant's and others' descriptions of limitation, and medical reports, to determine what capacity the claimant has for work despite the impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).
At step four, the ALJ may consider any of the claimant's daily activities that "may be seen as inconsistent with the presence of a condition which would preclude all work activity." Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding denial of disability benefits where claimant could "take care of her personal needs, prepare easy meals, do light housework, and shop for some groceries"); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding denial of benefits based in part on determination that claimant performed daily activities that were transferrable to a work setting); compare Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding activities not transferrable to work setting); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (claimant should not be "penalized for attempting to lead [a] normal [life] in the face of [her] limitations"); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that "many home activities are not easily transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of the workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication").
A claimant can return to previous work if he or she can perform the "actual functional demands and job duties of a particular past relevant job" or "[t]he functional demands and job duties of the [past] occupation as generally required by employers throughout the national economy." Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
If the claimant can still do past relevant work, then he or she is not disabled for purposes of the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f); see also Berry, 662 F.3d at 131 ("Generally, a claimant who is physically and mentally capable of performing past relevant work is ...