United States District Court, D. Nevada
JAMES C. MAHAN, District Judge.
Presently before the court is plaintiffs' motion to reconsider or in the alternative for clarification. (Doc. # 201). In that document, plaintiffs included three separate requests for (1) reconsideration/clarification; (2) entry of default; and (3) leave to file for partial summary judgment. ( Id. ). The clerk immediately notified counsel that, pursuant to special order 109, a separate document must be filed for each purpose.
Apparently in response, plaintiffs re-filed the motion and re-titled it as one seeking reconsideration and clarification. (Doc. # 203). Defendants have filed a response (doc. # 210) and plaintiffs have replied (doc. # 212).
To the extent doc. # 203 is duplicative of doc. # 201, the court denies doc. # 201 as moot. If plaintiffs still wish to move for leave to file and for entry of default, they must file separate motions as indicated by the clerk's notice.
The facts of this case have been extensively detailed in prior orders. ( See, e.g., doc. ## 177, 186). The court briefly highlights only those facts pertinent to the instant motions.
This case involves the repossession of plaintiffs' vehicle by the defendant repo company, Speedy Recovery Inc., and the individual repo agent, Dennis McGee. During discovery, McGee repeatedly failed to comply with his discovery obligations and the magistrate's orders. The magistrate issued a report recommending that McGee's answer be stricken as a sanction for his misconduct. (Doc. # 177). This court thereafter adopted the report and recommendation in its entirety. (Doc. # 186).
Defendants then filed a motion for clarification as to the separate issues of liability and damages. (Doc. # 188). Defendants sought clarification that striking McGee's answer did not affect his ability to defend against compensatory and punitive damages, and that it did not affect Speedy's ability to defend against both liability and damages. ( Id. ).
Prior to plaintiffs' response deadline, the court granted that motion. (Doc. # 190). The court clarified that "defendant McGee may defend himself against damages only, " relying on In re USA Commer. Mortg. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127433 (D. Nev. Nov. 12, 2010). The court further clarified that "the sanctions entered against McGee do not affect the ability of defendant Speedy to defend itself against both liability and damages."
II. Legal Standard
A motion for reconsideration "should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances." Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Reconsideration "is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).
Rule 59(e) "permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order, " however "the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs ask the court to (1) reconsider its prior ruling; (2) clarify that they may file for default against McGee; and (3) limit the scope of trial to ...