Law Office of Daniel Marks and Daniel Marks and Adam Levine, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Shannon C. Richards, Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondent.
BEFORE GIBBONS, DOUGLAS and SAITTA, JJ.
In this appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial review, we review a State Personnel Commission hearing officer's decision in a state employment matter. We conclude that the hearing officer did not err or abuse her discretion in determining that, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of NRS Chapter 284, while hearing officers may determine the reasonableness of disciplinary actions and recommend appropriate levels of discipline, only appointing authorities have the power to prescribe the actual discipline imposed on permanent classified state employees. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant Michael Taylor was employed bye respondent State of Nevada, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), in the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), in a permanent classified position as a group supervisor at Caliente Youth Center. As part of his duties there, Taylor participated in a room search due to allegations of youths stealing food. During the search, there was an incident involving Taylor and one of the youths. As a result of this incident, Taylor was issued a specificity of charges document that recommended his termination from employment. Thereafter, Taylor was dismissed from employment.
Taylor administratively appealed his dismissal pursuant to NRS 284.390, and following an evidentiary hearing, the State Personnel Commission hearing officer issued a decision setting aside Taylor's dismissal and remanding the case to DCFS to determine the appropriate level of discipline for Taylor's infraction. In her decision, the hearing officer recommended that DCFS impose a suspension and require remedial training concerning the use of force. Taylor sought reconsideration of the decision, arguing that the hearing officer, as opposed to the employer, should determine the appropriate amount of discipline where modified discipline is required. The hearing officer denied reconsideration, and Taylor subsequently filed a petition for judicial review to have a district court decide the issue of who determines the appropriate level of discipline in his situation. Following briefing by the parties, the district court denied Taylor's petition for judicial review, concluding that hearing officers are not required to determine the appropriate level of discipline after finding that dismissal was unreasonable. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Taylor argues that the statute governing hearings to determine the reasonableness of employee discipline, NRS 284.390, does not expressly address the situation where a hearing officer determines that dismissal from state employment is too severe, but that some amount of discipline is warranted for an employee's misconduct. He claims that some hearing officers remand the matter back to the employer, while other hearing officers determine the appropriate level of discipline themselves. Taylor asserts that the hearing officer should make the decision about the appropriate level of discipline because the hearing officer is the " fact finding tribunal" and doing so is consistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme adopted under NRS Chapter 284. We disagree and hold that pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of NRS Chapter 284,
while hearing officers may determine the reasonableness of disciplinary actions and recommend appropriate levels of discipline, only appointing authorities have the power to prescribe the actual discipline imposed on permanent classified state employees.
" When reviewing a district court's denial of a petition for judicial review of an agency decision, this court engages in the same analysis as the district court." Rio All Suite Hotel & Casino v. Phillips, 126 Nev.
___, ___, 240 P.3d 2, 4 (2010). Specifically, this court reviews an administrative agency's decision for an abuse of discretion or clear error. See id.; see also NRS 233B.135(3). In doing so, this court defers to the agency's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence; however, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Rio, 126 Nev. at __, 240 P.3d at 4. Although statutory construction is generally a question of law reviewed de novo, this court " defer[s] to an agency's interpretation of its governing statutes or regulations if the interpretation is within the language of the statute." Dutchess Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Nev. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 124 Nev. 701, ...