Manuel VASQUEZ; Miguel Bernal Lara; Gabriel Bastida; Randy Bastida, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Tony RACKAUCKAS, Orange County District Attorney, in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellant, and Robert Gustafson, Chief of Police, Orange Police Department, in his official capacity, Defendant. Manuel Vasquez; Miguel Bernal Lara; Gabriel Bastida; Randy Bastida, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Robert Gustafson, Chief of Police, Orange Police Department, in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellant, and Tony Rackauckas, Orange County District Attorney, in his official capacity, Defendant. Manuel Vasquez; Miguel Bernal Lara; Gabriel Bastida; Randy Bastida, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Tony Rackauckas, Orange County District Attorney, in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellant, and Robert Gustafson, Chief of Police, Orange Police Department, in his official capacity, Defendant. Manuel Vasquez; Miguel Bernal Lara; Gabriel Bastida; Randy Bastida, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Robert Gustafson, Chief of Police, Orange Police Department, in his official capacity, Defendant-Appellant, and Tony Rackauckas, Orange County District Attorney, in his official capacity, Defendant.
Argued and Submitted April 8, 2013.
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S. Frank Harrell (argued), Norman J. Watkins, and Melissa D. Culp, Lynberg & Watkins, Orange, CA, for Defendant-Appellant Tony Rackauckas.
Wayne W. Winthers (argued), Senior Assistant City Attorney; and David A. De Berry, City Attorney, Orange, CA, for Defendant-Appellant Robert Gustafson.
Peter Bibring (argued) and Belinda Escobosa Helzer, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Santa Ana, CA; Joseph J. Ybarra, Jacob S. Kreilkamp, and Laura D. Smolowe, Munger, Tolles & Olson, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney; Alex G. Tse, Chief Attorney, Neighborhood and Resident Safety Division; and Jana J. Clark, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, CA, for Amicus Curiae City and County of San Francisco.
Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney; Mary Clare Molidor, Deputy Chief, Criminal & Special Litigation Branch; Anne C. Tremblay, Assistant City Attorney; Kelly Huynh and Jeanne Kim, Deputy City Attorneys, Los Angeles, CA, for Amicus Curiae Los Angeles City Attorney's Office.
Matthew Sloan, Matthew Donald Umhofer, and Christina Lincoln, Los Angeles, CA, for Amici Curiae Orange County Public Defender, Los Angeles County Public Defender, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and California Public Defenders Association.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Valerie Baker Fairbank, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 8:09-cv-01090-VBF-RNB.
Before: MARSHA S. BERZON, RICHARD C. TALLMAN, and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Berzon; Concurrence by Judge Tallman.
BERZON, Circuit Judge:
Since at least 1987, California prosecutors have brought public nuisance actions in state court to curtail the activities of street gangs. See Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 Stan. L.Rev. 409, 414 (1999). The scope of this effort has been broad. According to amicus curiae Los Angeles City Attorney's
Office, that City, for example, has obtained forty-four civil injunctions against seventy-two street gangs in the past two decades. Typically, the injunctions forbid members of the enjoined gang from engaging in a broad swath of legal and illegal activities, individually and with others, in certain areas.
Our question concerns not the substance of such orders but the procedures constitutionally required before individuals denied the opportunity to defend against imposition of the order against them can be subjected to it. Although California courts have grappled for more than twenty-five years with various substantive and procedural issues posed by anti-gang injunctions, no court— either state or federal— has previously addressed the particular due process issue presented here.
The district court approached this case with the utmost care, first denying a preliminary injunction and then, after full discovery, presiding over an eleven-day bench trial. In a comprehensive opinion, the district court concluded that (1) the constitutional issue should be decided, as no applicable abstention doctrine justified declining to do so; and (2) in the particular posture of this case, and given the breadth of the state court injunction at issue, due process requires that the plaintiff class members be afforded an adequate opportunity to contest whether they are active gang members before they are subjected to the injunction. We affirm the district court in principal part.
California's Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, see Cal.Penal Code §§ 186.20-.33, creates both a private and a public cause of action to " enjoin[ ], abate[ ], and prevent[ ]" a " nuisance" created by a " building or place used by members of a criminal street gang for the purpose of the commission" of various criminal offenses, see id. § 186.22a(a). The California Supreme Court has held that the STEP Act's nuisance provision is not the exclusive " remed[y] ... to abate criminal gang activities," and that the " general public nuisance statutes," namely California Code of Civil Procedure § 731 and California Civil Code §§ 3479-3480, provide independent authority for actions to enjoin a gang and its members from engaging in nuisance activity. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1119, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277, 929 P.2d 596 (1997).
This appeal has its origins in an action to abate gang activity under California's general public nuisance statutes. Our analysis depends in significant part on the procedural history of the state case. We therefore describe the parties' litigation decisions and the relevant state and federal orders in some detail.
In February 2009, the Orange County District Attorney's Office (OCDA), on behalf of the State of California, filed a public nuisance action in Orange County Superior Court against the Orange Varrio Cypress Criminal Street Gang (OVC) and 115 named individuals. The named individuals were alleged to be " members, agents, servants, employees," or " persons acting under, in concert with, for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with" OVC. Of the 115 individual defendants, thirty-two were minors. OCDA further alleged that OVC's " criminal and nuisance activities" included: " attempt[ed] murders, shootings, robberies, assaults, burglaries, felony gang graffiti and the illegal sale of controlled substances" ; the use of private residential yards and commercial property as " escape routes" from law enforcement; and " vandalism, loitering, [and] drinking alcohol in public." OCDA sought a permanent injunction restraining OVC and its
members from engaging in a broad range of specified activities, lawful and unlawful, joint and individual, performed within a 3.78 square-mile area of the City of Orange. We discuss the scope of the requested relief— which, as we explain, the state court granted in principal part— in greater detail below.
Concurrently with its complaint, OCDA filed an application for a preliminary injunction against all defendants. In support, OCDA filed various exhibits, many under seal. The Superior Court also granted OCDA's ex parte application to serve the complaint on OVC, which had no known address, via a named defendant, Patrick DeHerrera. In addition, OCDA served " numerous individuals named in the state court complaint, including" the current Plaintiffs-Appellees, with the complaint and the unsealed documents in support of the preliminary injunction.
Thirty-two individual defendants filed answers or general denials in the state court action or otherwise formally appeared. Some juvenile defendants and their parents also attempted to file pleadings or enter appearances but were not permitted to do so. The court declined to designate the defendants' parents as guardians ad litem; without an appointed guardian, the juvenile defendants could not appear. See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 372(a).
The Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction against OVC and the adult individual defendants who had not appeared. Soon thereafter, the court issued a preliminary injunction against eighteen adult defendants unrepresented by counsel, including Plaintiffs-Appellees Manuel Vasquez and Gabriel Bastida. The court denied OCDA's motion for a preliminary injunction as to some adult defendants, and continued until May 7, 2009 the hearing as to certain other adult defendants and all juvenile defendants. The court also set a trial date of July 6, 2009.
In advance of the May 7 hearing, some of the adult defendants represented by counsel— including Plaintiff-Appellee Miguel Lara— filed motions opposing the entry of a preliminary injunction against them as individuals. In support, they filed their own declarations; declarations of community members disputing the need for an injunction; and declarations of experts who averred that the OCDA's evidence, including the Orange Police Department (" OPD" ) declarations, was insufficient to establish that the named defendants were " active members" of OVC. Through counsel, those defendants also propounded written discovery requests on OCDA; the parties established a schedule for twenty depositions during May and June 2009.
At the May 7 hearing, the state court denied OCDA's preliminary injunction motion as to all unrepresented juvenile defendants on the ground that any injunction would be immediately voidable by those defendants. The court also denied a preliminary injunction as to some adult and juvenile defendants represented by counsel, including Plaintiff-Appellee Randy Bastida, on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of those individuals' " active" participation in the gang. Among the other defendants as to whom the court denied a preliminary injunction for lack of sufficient evidence was Patrick DeHerrera, the person on whom OCDA chose to serve the complaint on behalf of OVC as an entity. The court granted a preliminary injunction as to other defendants, including
Plaintiff-Appellee Miguel Lara. As of May 7, OCDA had failed to obtain a preliminary injunction against at least twenty of the defendants originally named in the complaint.
Shortly thereafter, OCDA filed a request to dismiss from the case, without prejudice, sixty-two individual defendants, including the thirty-two adults and juveniles who had filed a general denial or an answer and all unrepresented juvenile defendants. OCDA did so because of the " aggressive effort on the [ ] part" of those individuals to defend themselves in court, and because of the concerns that the state court judge raised regarding entering a judgment against unrepresented juveniles. The court granted OCDA's dismissal request.
OCDA then requested and obtained a default judgment, including a permanent injunction (the " Order" ), against OVC as an entity, including OVC's " members, participants, agents, associates, servants, employees, aiders, and abettors whose membership, participation, agency, association, service, employment, aid, or abetment is more than nominal, passive, inactive, or purely technical, and all persons acting under, in concert with, for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with" OVC. The Order names as parties all individual defendants who had not been voluntarily dismissed by OCDA and as to whom the Superior Court had granted a preliminary injunction. We attach a copy of the Order as Exhibit A.
The Order forbids the enjoined parties from engaging in a variety of activities in " any public place, any place accessible to the public, or in public view" within a 3.78 square mile area— the " Safety Zone" — comprising about sixteen percent of the City of Orange. The prohibited activities include both unlawful and otherwise lawful conduct, such as:
• " stand[ing], sit[ting], walk[ing], driv[ing], bicycl[ing]," or " gather[ing] or appear[ing]" with any other enjoined parties, including family members;
• " confront[ing], intimidat[ing], annoy[ing], harass[ing], threat[ening], challeng[ing], provok[ing], assault[ing], or batter[ing]" anyone, or " remain[ing] in the presence of or assist[ing] anyone" the enjoined party knows to be performing such conduct;
• unlawfully using " any drug," or " remain[ing] in the presence of or assist[ing] anyone [the enjoined party] know[s] is unlawfully under the influence of any drug" ;
• " possess[ing]," " transport[ing]," or " sell[ing]" guns or various other weapons, or " remain[ing] in the presence" of such weapons;
• " us[ing], display[ing], or communicat[ing] by means of any words, phrases, physical gestures, hand signs, or symbols that [the enjoined party] know[s] describe, represent, or refer to the [OVC], or ... remain[ing] in the presence of or assist[ing] anyone [the enjoined party] know[s]" is performing such conduct;
• " wear[ing], display[ing], exhibit[ing], or possess[ing] any clothes or accessories that [the enjoined party] know[s] ... refer[s] to the [OVC] gang, including clothes or accessories that display, exhibit, or feature ... the ... word[ ] ‘ Orange,’ ... the
color orange, or ... remain[ing] in the presence of ... anyone that [the enjoined party] know[s] is wearing" such clothing;
• drinking alcohol; possessing an open container of alcohol; or knowingly remaining in the presence of a person drinking or possessing such an open container, without exception for a person eating or working in a restaurant; 
• for minors, being in a " public place, vacant lot, or business establishment" between 10pm and 5am unless : (1) accompanied by a parent, legal guardian, or responsible adult; (2) on an errand at the direction of a parent or guardian; (3) on a sidewalk in front of or adjacent to the minor's dwelling; (4) in, or en route to or from, a " place of lawful entertainment, recreation, culture, or charity" during that place's operating hours, or in or en route to or from lawful employment or volunteer activity; (5) en route to or from, or engaged in, " an official school, official religious, or other expressive activity within the scope of [one's] rights under the First Amendment," where such activity is " supervised or overseen by an adult person on behalf of" a civic organization; (6) responding to an emergency situation; or (7) " in a vehicle engaged in interstate travel" ;
• for adults, being in a " public place, vacant lot, or business establishment" between 10pm and 5am unless : (1) on a sidewalk in front of or adjacent to the person's dwelling; (2) in, or en route to or from, a " place of lawful entertainment, recreation, culture, or charity" during that place's operating hours, or in, or en route to or from, lawful employment or volunteer activity; (3) en route to or from, or engaged in, " an official school, official religious, or other expressive activity within the scope of [one's] rights under the First Amendment" ; (4) responding to an emergency situation; or (5) " in a vehicle engaged in interstate travel."
As noted, the Order applies not only to the named parties, but also to OVC's " members," without regard to whether such individuals were acting on behalf of OVC or, except as specified in the Order, with other OVC members, when engaged in proscribed activities. The Order does not provide any procedures for the parties or the Superior Court to determine which, if any, unnamed parties were " members" of OVC and therefore subject to the Order's terms. The Order has no expiration date.
A few weeks after default entry of judgment, the OPD, at OCDA's instruction, began serving the Order not only on the individual defendants against whom the injunction had issued, but also on individuals originally named as defendants in the state court case but voluntarily dismissed by OCDA. By September 2009, OCDA and OPD had served at least forty-eight individuals who had been named in the nuisance suit against OVC but whom OCDA voluntarily dismissed.
Along with the Order, OCDA and OPD served the following " Notice" :
YOU ARE HEREBY PUT ON NOTICE THAT ON MAY 14, 2009, JUDGE KAZUHARU MAKINO SIGNED AN ORDER FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION AGAINST THE ORANGE VARRIO CYPRESS CRIMINAL STREET GANG.
ALL MEMBERS OF THE GANG ARE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION.
ALL MEMBERS OF THE GANG, WHETHER OR NOT NAMED IN THE ORIGINAL LAWSUIT ... AND LATER DISMISSED FROM THE LAWSUIT ... ARE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THE PERMANENT GANG INJUNCTION....
ALL PERSONS DESCRIBED ABOVE WILL FACE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 166(a)(4) FOR ANY WILLFUL VIOLATION OF ANY PROVISION LISTED IN THE PERMANENT GANG INJUNCTION.
The Superior Court had no role in reviewing or approving the notice.
About four months after entry of the Order, four individuals on whom OCDA and OPD served the Order and Notice filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the heads of OCDA and OPD— District Attorney Tony Rackauckas and Chief of Police Robert Gustafson— in their official capacities (collectively " Orange" ). Alleging that OCDA and OPD's " dismiss-and-serve strategy" violated the procedural due process clauses of the U.S. and California constitutions, Plaintiffs sought a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Orange's conduct and an injunction barring Orange from enforcing the Order against Plaintiffs " without first providing them with a full constitutionally[ ] adequate hearing." Plaintiffs presented no challenge to the terms of the Order; they challenged only the adequacy of their opportunity to contest the application of the Order to them.
The four named Plaintiffs sought to represent two classes: (1) adults and minors " named as individual defendants" in the state case, " who appeared ... in the Orange County Superior Court to defend themselves and were voluntarily dismissed by [OCDA]," and (2) minors " named as individual defendants" in the state case for whom no guardian ad litem was appointed and who were voluntarily dismissed by OCDA. The proposed class definitions excluded any individuals who were already being prosecuted for state criminal contempt proceedings for violating the Order.
The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction; granted Plaintiffs' motion to certify both classes; and denied the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. The district court then held an eleven-day bench trial, hearing testimony from fourteen witnesses, receiving more than 100 exhibits, and personally touring the area of the City of Orange covered by the Order. The court concluded that " Defendants deprived the Plaintiffs and those similarly situated of their constitutionally protected liberty or property interests without adequate procedural protections." The court also granted " an injunction barring Defendants from enforcing the Order against the Plaintiffs." The court emphasized that it was " not instructing the state court as to the nature of any hearing .... [T]he Court's order [is] directed to the Defendants, and not the state court." (emphasis in the original).
Orange timely appealed to this court.
Before turning to the merits of the due process claim, we address Orange's contentions that under various comity and federalism doctrines, the district court should have dismissed this suit rather than deciding the issue raised and granting equitable relief.
Orange maintains, first, that the suit should have been dismissed under the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), limiting federal courts' authority to enjoin ongoing state court proceedings in some instances. " In addressing Younger abstention issues, district courts must exercise jurisdiction except when specific legal standards are met, and may not exercise jurisdiction when those standards are met; there is no discretion vested in the district courts to do otherwise." San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.2008) (alteration omitted). We review de novo a district court's determination as to whether Younger abstention is warranted. See Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 982 n. 19 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc).
As relevant here, " usually, federal plaintiffs who are not also parties to pending litigation in state court may proceed with their federal litigation" without being barred under Younger. Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965 (9th Cir.2004). Only under " quite limited circumstances" may Younger " oust a district court of jurisdiction over a case where the plaintiff is not a party to an ongoing state proceeding." Id. at 1100. Such circumstances are present only when a federal plaintiff's interests are " so intertwined with those of the state court party that ... interference with the state court proceeding is inevitable." Id.
The district court properly declined to abstain under Younger. OCDA initially named Plaintiffs as parties in the Superior Court action but unilaterally dismissed them. OCDA did so precisely because of Plaintiffs' " effort ... to fight" — that is, to present a defense in state court. " Younger abstention cannot apply to one ... who is a stranger to the state proceeding." Id. at 1103 (quoting Gottfried v. Med. Planning Servs. Inc., 142 F.3d 326, 329 (6th Cir.1998)). Orange made Plaintiffs " stranger[s]" to the state case by denying them an opportunity to be heard in state court on the question whether they were gang members. Id.
Moreover, as parties dismissed from the state case, Plaintiffs' interests are not " intertwined" with those against whom the Order was issued, namely, OVC and the remaining, named defendants. Id. at 1100. The question Plaintiffs raise in this case— the adequacy of OCDA's and OPD's gang-membership determination— arose precisely because Plaintiffs were dismissed from the state court litigation and so could not defend against the imposition of an injunction on them in that litigation. Those covered by name by the Order did not attempt to present a defense and were not dismissed from the litigation. The circumstances and interests of those covered by name in the Order and the Plaintiffs are therefore entirely divergent as to the procedural issues raised here.
In addition, the relief sought in federal court would not disturb the validity of the Order as to any of the parties against whom it issued. Plaintiffs do not challenge the terms of the Order. There is therefore nothing about Plaintiffs' interests that is currently " intertwined" with
those of the named state defendants against whom the injunction issued.
Orange's next federalism-related contention is that Plaintiffs' action is a " de facto appeal" of the Superior Court Order, barred by the Rooker - Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). We review de novo the district court's decision that Rooker - Feldman does not bar Plaintiffs' action. See Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir.2013).
As this court recently reiterated, the " de facto appeals" barred by Rooker - Feldman are those in which " a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court. " Id. at 897 (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir.2003)) (emphasis added). " In contrast, if ‘ a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker - Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.’ " Id. (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164) (emphasis added). " [E]ven if a plaintiff seeks relief from a state court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto appeal only if the plaintiff also alleges a legal error by the state court." Id.
Here, Plaintiffs " assert[ ] as a legal wrong" only OCDA and OPD's allegedly unconstitutional enforcement of the Order. See id. at 897. They present no challenge to the terms of the Order, nor do they otherwise " allege [ ] a legal error" by the Superior Court. See id. Plaintiffs' suit is therefore " not a forbidden de facto appeal" under Rooker - Feldman . See id.
Orange also asserts that the district court should have abstained from hearing Plaintiffs' case under more general principles of comity, equity, and federalism, unmoored from any particular abstention doctrine heretofore endorsed by the Supreme Court or our court. We review for abuse of discretion the district court's decision not to abstain under doctrines other than Younger. See United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 n. 23 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc); Green, 255 F.3d at 1092-93 & n. 10.
Orange's argument hinges on three out-of-circuit cases somewhat similar to this one but, in other respects, significantly different. In each of those cases, the federal court plaintiffs sought to enjoin prosecutors from enforcing state-court-issued injunctions against individuals not named in the state injunctions. In each case, the district court abstained from issuing the requested injunction, and the court of appeals affirmed the abstention. See Gottfried, 142 F.3d at 330-33; McKusick v. City of Melbourne, 96 F.3d 478, 487-89 (11th Cir.1996); Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845, 850-52 (7th Cir.1995).
In the case before us, the district court initially relied on these out-of-circuit authorities in denying Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. At that point, Plaintiffs were seeking an expansive injunction that would have required " judicial hearings[s]," with specific, prescribed procedural protections, before OPD and OCDA could enforce the Order against them. The district court concluded that such relief " would result ... in an inappropriate invocation of the equity powers of the federal court," because the remedy would require the involvement of a state judicial officer.
After Plaintiffs " clarified and narrowed" the injunctive relief sought, and after trial, the district court issued a permanent injunction against Orange, simply barring it " from enforcing the Order against the Plaintiffs." In so doing, the court emphasized that it was " not instructing the state court as to the nature of any hearing. "
We need not address whether the district court would have abused its discretion in denying an injunction along the lines originally sought by Plaintiffs. Nor need we decide whether Gottfried , McKusick, and Hoover properly state the contours of an abstention doctrine that a district court might follow under circumstances not present here. We do hold that in the posture of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to abstain from granting declaratory and injunctive relief after trial.
First, and most important, in the out-of-circuit cases, the plaintiffs challenged the terms of the state injunction. Not so here. Instead, Plaintiffs challenge only Orange's policy of enforcing the Order against them, given that they were dismissed from the state case and so deprived of that opportunity to adjudicate their membership in OVC before being subjected to the Order.
Second, the Plaintiffs here have neither sued the state judge who issued the relevant injunction, nor sought any relief from the state court. Instead, they seek to enjoin only the police and prosecutors whom the district court found, after trial, to have a policy of enforcing the Order against the same class of people dismissed from the state case. Cf. Gottfried, 142 F.3d at 328 (injunction sought against state judge); Hoover, 47 F.3d at 846, 851 (same).
Third, as we construe the district court's order, see infra Section V, the federal relief granted does not pose an undue risk of " thrust[ing] the federal court into an unseemly, repetitive, quasi-systematic, supervisory role over administration of the state court injunction." McKusick, 96 F.3d at 488. OCDA and OPD retain the broad discretion to enforce the Order, including against Plaintiffs, provided they provide the process guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. See infra Section V. Nor was the relief the district court granted based on " nebulous and speculative ... fears" that the Order would be enforced against them. Hoover, 47 F.3d at 851. As we discuss in Section IV.A, the district court's decision was based on particularized evidence introduced at trial that Orange has sought to enforce the state Order against the entirety of the Plaintiff class. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (upholding an injunction against a state prosecution " when a genuine threat of prosecution exist[ed]" ); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (holding that " federal declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution is pending and a
federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat of ...