VANGUARD PIPING Systems, Inc., n/k/a VG Pipe, LLC; Viega, LLC; Industries, Inc.; and Viega, Inc., Petitioners,
The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark; and the Honorable Susan Johnson, District Judge, Respondents, and Aventine-Tramonti Homeowners Association, a Nevada Nonprofit Corporation, Real Party in Interest.
Lincoln, Gustafson & Cercos and Nicholas B. Salerno, Las Vegas; Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, LLP, and Alexander P. Imberg, San Francisco, California, for Petitioners.
Canepa Riedy & Rubino and Scott K. Canepa, Terry W. Riedy, and Bryan T. Abele, Las Vegas; Carraway & Associates and James D. Carraway, Las Vegas; Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, and J. Randall Jones, Las Vegas; Lynch, Hopper & Salzano, LLP, and Francis Lynch, II, Las Vegas; Maddox, Isaacson & Cisnernos and Robert C. Maddox, Las Vegas, for Real Party in Interest.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires a party in litigation to produce for the opposing party any agreement where an insurance company may be required to pay all or part of any judgment entered in the action. Here, petitioners, defendants in the action below, disclosed certain insurance policies, which they contend are more than sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be entered against them. Thus, they assert that disclosure of any other primary or any secondary insurance policies is unnecessary unless the previously disclosed policies are exhausted. The district court ordered the petitioners to produce all previously undisclosed policies, and this writ petition followed. In it, we are asked to determine whether NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) compels disclosure of all insurance agreements, regardless of whether the policy limits exceed the amount of potential liability or whether the policies provide secondary coverage. We conclude that it does because the plain language of NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires disclosure of any insurance agreement that may be liable to pay a portion of a judgment. Therefore, we deny the petition.
In the district court, real party in interest Aventine-Tramonti Homeowners Association
filed construction defect actions against petitioners Vanguard Piping Systems, Inc.; Viega, LLC; Industries, Inc.; and Viega, Inc. (collectively, Vanguard), and Vanguard's German parent companies Viega GmbH and Viega International GmbH. In June 2012, this court entered a stay of the district court proceedings as to the German parent companies, which, to date, has not been lifted. The stay order did not stay or otherwise limit any pending proceedings against Vanguard.
During discovery in the present case, Vanguard disclosed some of its primary insurance agreements to Aventine-Tramonti, pursuant to NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D). Aventine-Tramonti subsequently learned that additional undisclosed policies covering Vanguard may have been purchased by the German parent companies and sought the disclosure of any such agreements. The special master ordered Vanguard to disclose these agreements after it initially refused to do so.
Vanguard objected to the special master's order and sought relief from the district court on the grounds that producing the insurance agreements would violate the stay of proceedings against the German parent companies and that it had already complied with NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D)'s requirements by disclosing its primary insurance agreements that were sufficient to cover any judgment against it. The district court affirmed the special master's order, finding that NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires disclosure of any insurance agreement that may be used to satisfy a judgment. This writ petition followed.
Vanguard petitions this court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. " A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." Int'l Game Tech. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also NRS 34.160. Because writ relief is an extraordinary remedy, this court " will exercise [its] discretion to consider such a petition only when there is no ‘ plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.’ " Cheung v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 867, 869, 124 P.3d 550, 552 (2005) (quoting NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330). The right to an appeal is generally an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004). Thus, this court typically will not exercise its discretion to review a pretrial discovery order unless ...