The opinion of the court was delivered by: Robert C. Jones United States District Judge
This case arises out of a real estate investment agreement. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants absconded with the money Plaintiffs gave them to invest on their behalf. Defendants filed separate Counterclaims. Pending before the Court are Defendant Jeff Ehlert's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ((ECF No. 156) and Defendant Michael Vannozzi's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 157). For the reasons given herein, the Court denies the motions except to the extent that Plaintiff Jay Westerdal has conceded that only his company Plaintiff Intelligence, Inc. has standing to sue.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On or about April 26, 2010, Defendant Lauchlin McKinnon contacted Plaintiff Jay Westerdal, the cofounder, CEO, and President of Plaintiff Name Intelligence, Inc. ("NI"), about a business venture ("the Business") to invest in foreclosed real estate in Las Vegas, Nevada. (Compl. 3, ECF No. 1). Westerdal and McKinnon met in Mercer Island, Washington on May 21, 2010 and agreed to proceed with the following business plan: (1) NI would provide initial funds; (2) McKinnon and Defendant Jeff Ehlert would use the funds to purchase real property at foreclosure sales; (3) McKinnon and Ehlert would rehabilitate and resell the properties at a profit; and (4) 75% of profits would go to NI and 25% would go to McKinnon. (Id. 3--4). McKinnon promised a 40% return on investment. (Id. 4).
On or about June 1, 2010, Plaintiffs provided McKinnon and Ehlert with $700,000 in cashier's checks, and between June 3 and June 8, 2010 McKinnon and Ehlert purchased seven pieces of real property in Las Vegas, Nevada. (Id.). On June 10, 2010, in response to a June 7, 2010 request from McKinnon, Plaintiffs provided McKinnon and Ehlert with an additional $1 million in cashier's checks, which Plaintiffs believe McKinnon and Ehlert used to purchase more properties. (See id. 4--5).
On or about June 15, 2010, Defendants ceased communications with Plaintiffs, and despite Plaintiffs' directions to Defendants to cease operating with the capital Plaintiffs provided, Plaintiffs believe Defendants continued to operate with Plaintiffs' funds or the proceeds thereof.
5). Defendants have refused to return the capital. (Id.). Plaintiffs believe that some of the properties purchased do not exist or were purchased under a name other than Name Intelligence or the Business. (See id.). Plaintiffs believe most or all of their funds were commingled, rather than separated by single-purpose LLC, or were placed into the attorney trust account of Defendant Charles Lybarger, who represents the Business, McKinnon, and/or Ehlert. (See id. 5-- 6). Plaintiffs believe that Lybarger has since distributed the funds to McKinnon and Ehlert. (See
Plaintiffs sued Defendants in diversity in this Court on five causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of fiduciary duties; (3) accounting; and (4)--(5) violation of the Securities Act of Washington, Wash. Rev. Code ("WRC") section 21.20.140. (See id.). The Court granted a preliminary injunction against Defendants' further disposition of Plaintiffs' funds or real property acquired therewith. Two days before the Court denied Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). The FAC added a sixth cause of action to quiet title to the thirteen properties (the "Properties") allegedly purchased with Plaintiffs' funds. Plaintiffs presumably did this to bring the Properties within the Court's in rem jurisdiction, and Defendants within the Court's quasi in rem jurisdiction, should the Court have ruled there was no in personam jurisdiction over Defendants in Nevada. The FAC omitted Lybarger as a Defendant, and Plaintiffs had already voluntarily dismissed Lybarger without
See id.). Defendants stipulated to permit Plaintiffs to file the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). The SAC added Michael Vannozzi (the broker as to transactions concerning seven of the Properties) as a Defendant and sought to hold him vicariously liable under a seventh cause of action based upon Ehlert's actions. (See id. 11--12). Plaintiffs then filed ion to amend the SAC, which the Court granted. The Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") names Lybarger as a Defendant and seeks to hold him and others liable for conversion under the newly added eighth cause of action.
On August 10, 2011, Ehlert filed his Counterclaim listing five causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) quantum meruit; (4) defamation; and (5) declaratory relief. On August 11, 2011, McKinnon filed a separate Counterclaim listing six causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing: (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) quantum meruit; (5) declaratory relief; and (6) injunctive relief. Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary
The Court granted summary judgment against Ehlert's defamation and punitive damage counterclaims and against McKinnon's counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and punitive damages. also set aside the default previously entered against Lybarger.
Ehlert has asked the Court to rule that Nevada law controls, and that the Court therefore cannot entertain securities claims under Washington statutes. He also asks the Court to rule that Westerdal himself can recover nothing, as he has admitted that the only losses complained of are a corporation he represents. Vannozzi has separately moved for summary judgment. LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Oak Harbor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Sears Roebuck, & Co., 513 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2008). Factual materiality is driven by the substantive law's determination of which facts are critical to the elements of the claim. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, then a genuine dispute exists and summary judgment is not appropriate. See id. at 250--51. A court does not weigh the evidence or credibility of witnesses in making this determination. Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007).
The moving party has the initial burden of informing the court how the pleadings and trial discovery "demonstrate the absence of a genuine ...