The opinion of the court was delivered by: C.W. Hoffman, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for a Bill of Particulars (#16), filed on July 15, 2011, and Government's Response to Defendant's Motion for a Bill of Particulars (#25), filed on July 28, 2011; Defendant's Motion to Sever Counts (#17), filed on July 15, 2011, and the Government's Response to Defendant's Motion to Sever Counts (#23), filed on July 28, 2011; Defendant's Motion for Handwriting Exemplars (#18), filed on July 15, 2011, Defendant's Motion for Review and Production of Agent Personnel Files (#19), filed on July 15, 2011, Defendant's Motion to Compel Production of Original Documents (#21), Government's Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel (#26), filed on July 29, 2011, and Defendant's Reply to Government's Consolidated Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel (#30), filed on August 15,
Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars (#16)
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) provides that a "court may direct the government to file a bill of particulars." "The defendant may move for a bill of particulars before or within 14 days after arraignment or at a later time if the court permits." Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f). The court has the discretion to grant the request for a bill of particulars. United States v. Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1054 (9th Cir.1983). A bill of particulars serves three purposes: (1) to inform the defendant of the of the charges against him with sufficient precision to enable him to prepare for trial; (2) to avoid or minimize the danger of surprise at the time of trial; and (3) to protect against double jeopardy. United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Indictment (#1) was filed on February 16, 2011, and Defendant's arraignment occurred on March 3, 2011 (#8). Defendant's first request for a bill of particulars was filed on July 15, 2011, four months after the arraignment. Defendant cannot wait this long and then, when the case approaches trial, feign uncertainty as to the charges against him. Not only did the deadline to move bill of particulars expire, but the Defendant also failed to obtain this Court's permission to request a bill of particulars pursuant to Rule 7(f). Accordingly, the Defendant's motion is untimely and must be denied on that ground.
Notwithstanding the untimeliness of the motion, the Defendant's motion (#16) must also be denied on its merits. The Court finds the indictment contains sufficient facts to apprise Defendant of the charges against him, afford him an opportunity to prepare his defense, and to avoid double jeopardy. See United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 1979). The eleven page indictment specifically identifies the charged conduct and contains detailed information concerning the dates of specific conduct, the amount of money wired to the Defendant, the amount of money promised in return, and identifying information of the victim. Thus, even assuming timeliness, the Court finds that a bill of particulars is unwarranted.
Defendant's Motion to Sever Counts (#17)
Defendant requests that the Court sever Counts 1-4 of the Indictment from Count 5 because of misjoinder under Rule 8 or, alternatively, because of undue prejudice under Rule 14.
Rule 8(a) provides that an indictment may charge a defendant in separate counts only if the offenses "are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan." Fed. R.Crim. P. 8(a). In the Ninth Circuit, distinct offenses may be joined in a single indictment when those offenses may be viewed as part of a common "transaction;" that term is defined broadly and "'may comprehend a many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship."' United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1083 (1970) (quoting Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926)). "Even dissimilar charges may be joined against multiple defendants if they arise out of the same series of transactions constituting an offense or offenses." Roselli v. United States, 432 F.2d 879, 898 (9th Cir. 1970). "The similar character of the joined offenses should be ascertainable-either readily apparent or reasonably inferred-from the face of the indictment." United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 2007). The "validity of the joinder is determined solely by the allegations in the indictment." United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 276 (9th Cir.1990).
In determining if the counts of the indictment were properly joined, the Court considers the counts are the same or similar in character. Appropriate factors to consider include "the elements of the statutory offenses, the temporal proximity of the acts, the likelihood and extent of evidentiary overlap, the physical location of the acts, the modus operandi of the crimes, and the
of the victims." Jawara,474 F.3d at 578. Initially, the Court notes that all the counts charged in the indictment are brought under the same statutory provision, alleging wire fraud perpetrated by the Defendant. Although Counts 1-4 relate to a different wire fraud scheme than that alleged in Count 5, in both schemes the Defendant allegedly obtained money under false pretenses, promising large returns on the invested money. This evidences the same modus operandi. Further, the Sinymante conduct occurred on or about February 20, 2008 through December 2008 while the Changing Planet scheme is alleged to have ...